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RIO GRAIDE AID OF MEXICO. 



NOTICES OF THE RECENT WORK OF MAJOR RIPLEY. 



BY 

BREVET-MAJOR ISAAC I. STEVENS, 
U. S. AEMY. 



NEW-YORK : 
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, 

200 BROADWAY. 

MDCCCLI. 




fee ^ /^,e&^^<^ 



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Entered, according to Act of Congress, by 
D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
Southern District of New-York. 



• * 



I N 



TO 

-THE MEN OF MEXICO' 7 

CTIjese $a$jfs 

ARE RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED. 

I. I. s. 



PREFACE. 



In presenting these pages to the public, the writer relied 
much on manuscript notes, taken in the field and while 
the events were occurring. His object in appearing before 
the public was to testify to the services of those heroic offi- 
cers and soldiers, who were in his judgment depreciated in 
the work of Major Ripley. He felt impelled to this course 
by a sense of duty ; and he appeals to all the actors in those 
scenes to bear testimony in vindication of the truth. Other- 
wise the work of Major Ripley will be considered authen- 
tic in all respects, and its authority will perpetuate many 
wrong views of these transactions. At the same time he 
thinks the work has much positive merit. It shows deci- 
ded ability and promises well for the future. Should Major 
Ripley come to this task again, with powers matured by 
a few years more study and reflection, and with entire 
freedom from partisan feelings, there is no doubt his reputa- 
tion as a military writer would be established, and his 
work appealed to as authority. 

Washington, May 10th. 1851. 



CAMPAIGNS 



OF THE 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 



These pages have been occasioned by the publication 
of a recent work by Major Ripley, giving in great detail 
the events'of the Mexican War. 

The work is professedly critical, and much space 
is devoted to the discussion of the political and military 
movements of both Mexico and the United States. A very 
thorough exposition has been made of the plans both of 
campaigns and of battles. The style is decidedly good. 
The accuracy of the narrative we feel bound in general 
terms to commend. But we shall be constrained to differ 
from some of the military criticisms. Our own views we 
shall present with entire freedom. Our object is the vindi- 
cation of the truth of History. 

We shall leave to others the duty of a more critical ex- 
position of the literary qualities of Major Ripley's work 
We propose simply to examine his narrative of the cam- 



8 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

paigns of Taylor and of Scott ; we shall at the same time 
present some general views in relation to our operations in 
Mexico ; we shall touch upon the military genius and the 
military polity of our people ; and we shall inquire into 
the causes of our wonderful success. 

We particularly invite attention to his view of the origin 
of the war, a view we deem eminently just, and of which 
we will give the following summary. 

Texas, by the battle of San Jacinto, established her sep- 
arate existence and became acknowledged as one of the 
independent nations of the earth. In the exercise of an un- 
doubted right, and by her own voluntary act, she became a 
member of the American Confederacy. This was declared 
just cause of war by Mexico, her minister was recalled, and 
preparations were made to appeal to arms. To meet this 
contingency the American Government threw a force 
into Texas, and assembled a fleet in the Gulf; to avert 
it, attempts were made to negotiate for the settlement of 
the questions in dispute. As regarded Texas, the only real 
question in dispute was one of boundary. With Mexico, 
however, the whole of Texas was at issue. The Sabine 
was the boundary claimed. The proposition to negotiate 
was met by the demand of withdrawing our fleet from the 
coast, our troops from the soil of Mexico. Thus a quasi 
state of war continued for many months. Finally, on 
the administration of Herrera intimating a willingness to ne- 
gotiate, a minister actually proceeded to Mexico. He was 
not received, on the pretext that the proposition was to re- 
ceive a special minister for the settlement of the Texas 
question only. This abortive attempt at negotiation led' 
to a pronunciamiento by Paredes, and the overthrow of the 
administration of Herrera. And thus in the feverish, in- 
flamed, unsettled state of the public mind of Mexico, it be- 
came apparent that stronger measures were necessary. Un- 
willing to resort at once to arms, which would have been 



EIO GEANDE AND OF MEXICO. 9 

justified by the refusal of Mexrco to receive our Minister 
and by constant vaunts of her intention to make that 
appeal, it is resolved to make the bold political and military 
move of marching our tooops to the extreme verge of our 
claim ; and in April our little army is encamped on the banks 
of the Rio Grande. Its positive effect was to bring to an end 
that worst of all states, a quasi war, and to make Mexico 
show her hand. It was hoped that, as a most significant 
expression of the determination of the American Govern- 
ment, it might induce the Mexican nation to negotiate. If 
resort were had to the alternative of arms, none of us at 
home, who knew the character of that little army, and the 
great qualities of its commander, for a moment doubted the 
result. By the act of Mexico the war was commenced. 
The splendid achievements of Palo-Alto and Resaca rudely 
dispelled the presumptuous hopes of the enemy, and fairly 
opened the campaign. 

Thus this war was a political necessity, which, as it 
depended on causes beyond the control of the American 
Government, could be averted by no sagacity of theirs. 
These causes, not then well understood, are to be found in 
the unstable, ever-changing policy of Mexican administra- 
tion ; in that rule of faction which rent the land, and made 
it the prey of one military dictator after another ; in that 
utter ignorance of the resources of its antagonist, which was 
characteristic of even its most enlightened public men. The 
moderation of our government, and the reiterated attempts 
to negotiate, were considered evidences of weakness. The 
clamors of opposition, it was fancied, would soon ripen into 
a pronunciamiento in their favor. The public mind could 
only be pacified by an appeal to arms. Mexico needed 
the sad experience of defeat and dismemberment, to be 
awakened to a sense of her international duties. 

It was fortunate that at this juncture we had at the 
head of affairs so firm, so wise, so discreet a President as 



10 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

Mr. Polk, ably seconded by that true-hearted patriot and 
statesman, Governor W. L. Marcy. Americans, through all 
time, can refer with pride to the unceasing endeavors to avert 
a hostile collision with a weak and neighboring republic, 
which, almost at the expense of proper self-respect, were 
made by our government. Not a lingering doubt can rest 
upon the fact, that we were urged to it by causes beyond our 
control, and that we entered upon it with clean hands. 

Having thus been forced into the contest, it became the 
duty of the American government, in prosecuting it with 
energy, to demand indemnity for the past and security for 
the future. Not doubting that a few vigorous blows would 
end it, both our generals and statesmen were of opinion that 
operations should be pushed from the existing base of the 
Rio Grande. The object in view was not simply to termi- 
nate the present state of actual collision, but that previous, 
and more to be feared, condition of a quasi war, so unpropi- 
tious to the progress of a frontier state. It was resolved, in 
short, to " conquer a peace." 

Before entering upon the narrative of the stirring events 
of the war, we will premise the following general views of 
the organization and disciplining of armies, some of which 
we find happily set forth in the work under consideration. 
The true military polity of a state provides for the most 
effective calling forth and organizing of its public force, to 
produce the greate t result against an enemy. It should 
grow out of the spirit and genius of the people, and be in 
harmony with all its institutions. Thus the science of 
war is based upon political as well as military consider- 
ations, and involves the thorough study of all the moral 
and intellectual energies of man. The army of a state 
should embody the heroic characteristics of its people, and 
be a noble representative of its varied resources and capaci- 
ties. Its commander, to devoted patriotism and a consum- 
mate knowledge of his art, should add a thorough under- 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 11 

standing of the political institutions of his country, and a 
comprehensive view of the problem of government. Man- 
kind, not only in the embodiment of an army, but as 
united under governments, by alliances, as associated in 
neighborhoods and societies, and as expressed in individual 
action, should have been his grand study. 

A public force thus organized and commanded, in- 
stinct with devotion to country, endowed with a noble 
humanity, moving as one man, will be terrible in bat- 
tle, merciful in victory, friends and not oppressors to the 
people, upon whose hostile soil they march as conquer- 
ors. 

The circumstances attending the settlement and pro- 
gress of the people of the United States have developed, 
to a remarkable degree, those soldierly qualities essential to 
the rapid organization of an army. The whole progress 
of the country has been a war with the wilderness and 
the savage. Our whole history has been renowned for its 
peaceful conquests. Self-relying, rugged, indomitable ; 
from earliest youth accustomed to the use of arms ; with 
hands taught on the farm and in the workshop, ready for 
any new enterprise ; with heads in many cases disciplined 
in severe schools of study, — no recorded people can so 
soon be converted into disciplined troops. 

Thus it has become the established policy of the gov- 
ernment to maintain in time of peace a small stand- 
ing army in the highest state of discipline and efficiency, 
serving as a nucleus to that larger force to be called 
suddenly forth from civil life, whose peaceful mission, the 
conquest of the wilderness and the savage, is a fit prepa- 
ration for the contingency of war. 

The most complete vindication of the wisdom of this 
policy is to be found in the alacrity with which our citizens, 
at the breaking out of the Mexican war, flocked to the 
standard of their country, and endured the manifold ills of 



12 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

a sickly climate and an unprepared field, — in the rapidity 
with which, in spite of want of organization and defects of 
discipline, they became reliable troops, and in the general 
constancy and good conduct they manifested in the various 
vicissitudes of the campaign. 

Disciplined troops are far more effective, both for the 
multifarious duties of the campaign and the shock of bat- 
tle, than hastily collected levies, whether under an or- 
ganization of volunteers or additional regulars. Such 
troops are more amenable to discipline, suffer less from 
disease, are more patient and enduring under hardship, 
and more firm and undaunted in a perilous crisis. 

It is therefore important, that the veteran standing force 
should be raised to that condition of numbers, discipline, 
and organization, as really to afford the means of impart- 
ing, in a short time, equal efficiency to the whole body of 
new troops. The veterans give steadiness, confidence, 
discipline to new troops, and new troops, in return, quicken 
the patriotism and enthusiasm of veterans. 

On the occurrence of our difficulties with Mexico, the 
standing army was too small. A grave error had been 
committed in the army reduction of 1842, making the 
companies mere skeletons, and reducing the whole number 
of bayonets and sabres to less than eight thousand. 
This small force, moreover, had been disseminated through 
the country in small garrisons, a condition utterly unpro- 
pitious to high discipline and efficiency. There had been 
few general camps of discipline, where all arms had met 
together to learn the military art. In consequence of this 
system of petty garrisons, and this neglect of camps of dis- 
cipline, regiments were deficient in the regimental drill, and 
practical instruction in evolutions of the line was almost un- 
known. The officers, though thoroughly educated at the 
military school, and anxious to master their profession, had 
been allowed few opportunities of experience and instruc- 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 13 

tion, except in the subordinate details of the particular arm 
to which they were attached. The great body of the ar- 
tillery even served as infantry. There were no engineer 
troops, and little or nothing had been done in the instruc- 
tion of special arms, excepting the light artillery. The army 
had been regarded more as a police force to maintain forts, 
and guard our Indian frontier, than as an embodiment of the 
military skill and science of the country. A great portion of 
the rank and file were foreigners. There had been no le- 
gislation to bring a material into the army comparing favor- 
ably with that to be found in the several trades and occupa- 
tions of civil life. The army contemplated in the military 
polity of the country had not been cherished by its legisla- 
tion. No system had been adopted, considering the army 
as a whole, impressing each officer and each man with the 
spirit of his relations to it, and opening to all a professional 
career. 

It rnu^t be considered as one of the most happy chances 
of this contest, that the troops who kept the flag of their 
country high advanced on the battle-fields of the Rio 
Grande, had been previously in training for this very 
emergency, in their six months' camp at Corpus Christi, 
and thus had been raised to a point of discipline and 
efficiency, which, with proper forecast on the part of the 
Government, might have been imparted to the whole army. 

Grave errors, too, were committed in the mode of en- 
larging the public force, and in not taking a sufficiently 
extended view of the chances and vicissitudes of the cam- 
paign. There were three modes of enlarging the public force : 
1st, By an extension of the frame of the old army, increas- 
ing the companies of the regiments to 24, organized in 
three battalions, as in the French service ; advancing all 
the officers, and filling the vacancies at the foot of the list 
by selections from civil life, and increasing the number of 
men in a company to 150. Thus would the veteran 



14 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

organization have been more than quintupled, regiments 
and companies have been commanded by experienced 
officers, and a portion of the new troops have been saved 
from the privations and sufferings arising from the inex- 
perience of new officers, who have to learn the making out 
of the ordinary returns, to say nothing of more important 
matters. 2d, By adding new regiments of regulars. 
3d, By calling out volunteers. We think the calling out 
of volunteers, organized in regiments officered by them- 
selves, was a happy thought, in accordance with the spirit 
of our institutions, and as best calculated, in an emer- 
gency, to get troops promptly to the threatened point. 
But, conjoined with this, we think it was an oversight 
in not giving a greater increase to the regular force. 
One regiment of rifles and a company of engineer soldiers 
were added to the regular organization, and the number 
of privates in a company was raised to one hundred. With 
the expansion of the frame of the organization which we 
have indicated, and which has its analogies in foreign 
services, we should have provided for the emergencies 
which actually occurred, and which a wise forecast would 
have anticipated in embarking in a war. It would have 
increased the regular force to 50,000 odd, rank and file, the 
whole of which, with proper exertions, could have been 
raised in the summer of 1846 ; and which, allowing one- 
fifth at the depots, or en route for the seat of war, and 
one-fifth for the permanent sick-list, would have left three- 
fifths, or 30,000 regulars, for field service, at the beginning 
of the healthy season in the fall. 

But the capital error of the government, and one for 
which it cannot be held blameless, consisted in not placing 
a proper confidence in the counsels of some of the ablest 
military men of the country — men who had devoted their 
lives to the military profession, and had seen service in 
former fields. Both the President and the Secretary of 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 15 

War, experienced as statesmen, were totally inexperienced 
in military affairs ; and it was a violation of the plainest 
principles of administration, to endeavor to organize cam- 
paigns without reference to the views of those who had 
made campaigns their special study. It was unfortu- 
nate that General Scott, altogether the ablest military 
man then known to the country, was not admitted to 
the confidence of the Executive, and the plan of cam- 
paign modified to suit his views. They did not suit, 
however, the impatient spirit of our government and 
people. Results were eagerly grasped at, and though sound 
policy approved the plan of seizing New Mexico and 
California, as indemnity for the war, yet the plan of 
General Scott, to call out the volunteers and place them in 
camps of instruction at home, should have been pursued. 
They would have acquired a respectable degree of disci- 
pline, have become inured to the privations of the field, and 
have thus been enabled to resist the inroads of disease in an 
unhealthy climate. In the mean time, information could 
have been obtained, depots established, means of transpor- 
tation collected, and a plan of campaign could have been 
decided on. Had this course been pursued, when our army 
did move, one vigorous blow, one onward resistless march, 
and the contest would have been over. We do not say 
this in disparagement of the patriotic services of the 
President and his Secretary. We are not unmindful of 
the fact, that it is easy to write these things after the 
event. The claims of these high functionaries to the 
gratitude of their country lies in the fact, that they did 
pursue a practicable, energetic course, that they did apply 
with energy and success the public means to the prosecu- 
tion of an inevitable contest, and that they availed them- 
selves of the high state of exaltation of the public mind to 
enlist troops and send them to the field. It is just, however, 
to present their mistakes in an impartial view of this matter, 



16 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

so that we may profit by our own blunders, the readiest 
mode of getting wisdom, both on the part of nations and of 
individuals. 

On certain essential points there was a most happy 
union of sentiment between the government and the com- 
manders of its armies. It was determined to conduct 
the war on the most humane principles, so that none of its 
calamities should fall on non-combatants. The laws of the 
State were enforced, its religion respected, the inhabitants 
protected in their property, their homes, and their lives. 
The troops were not permitted to live at free quarters. 
Every thing was purchased at a fair price. All violations 
of the law were promptly punished. In the hour of victo- 
ry mercy was shown to the conquered, and kindness was 
lavished on the prisoner. The aim of all was to soothe and 
tranquillize the people, and to make them feel we were 
friends, and not oppressors. It was seen, from the nature 
of the contest, that this course promised the only hope of 
bringing the question to an amicable termination. It in- 
volved larger trains in forwarding supplies, so that we might 
not touch the sparse stores of the inhabitants, much delay 
in prosecuting operations ; and the results were not apparent- 
ly as rapid and brilliant as they would otherwise have been. 
It was also agreed in prosecuting the contest, that it was a 
cardinal point to maintain the highest possible ascendency 
over the minds of the Mexican people, and that in conse- 
quence it was necessary that not only should we conquer 
in every encounter, but that after once having planted our 
foot, it should not be withdrawn. Every movement must 
be one of advance, which involved caution, and of course 
delay in movement. 

Yet the disciplining of the troops, and the details 
of the campaign, are open to criticism. And first of all, 
we will premise the following observations : In war, 
troops should be kept actively employed, either in mov- 



RIO GRANDE AND OP MEXICO. 17 

able columns, operating against the enemy, or in camps 
of discipline, learning the military art ; and in -a mild 
climate, as in Mexico, they should live under canvas, 
and be kept out of large cities, those Capuas to troops. 
Even the bulk of the garrisons of the cities should live out- 
side the walls ; key-points within being simply held by de- 
tachments from the main body, relieved daily. Thus the 
garrison will have all the mobility of a column, a greater 
prestige over the minds of the inhabitants, and be freed from 
those demoralizing influences, which the strictest discipline 
cannot counteract. 

In operating against an enemy, it should be the study of 
the general to make the superiority of his troops felt in 
every particular : in rapidity of marches, aptitude for fa- 
tigue, patience under hardship, steadiness and confi- 
dence in vicissitude, as well as in the onslaught and the 
pursuit. »With this view, from the first day of taking 
the field, every man should be put in training, as those 
were who contended for the honors of the Olympic games. 
Officers and men should, of course, be well instructed in 
the miscellaneous duties of the camp and march ; but every 
effort should be made to invigorate the physique, and ele- 
vate the morale. The exercises should not be restricted to 
the drill. They should include marches ordinary and 
forced, and the encountering of obstacles met with in the 
field. They should be accustomed to carry burdens. 
With the Romans, the exercises of peace were more 
severe than those of war ; and their soldiers rejoiced when 
they marched against an enemy. Every day should show 
an increase of physical and moral force. 

The geography and resources of the country, moreover, 
require a careful examination, as they must necessarily 
modify the details of the campaign. 

But mobility is the essential quality to be given to an 
army. It is better to run a little risk as regards food, cloth- 
2 



18 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

ing, and even the materiel of war, than so to encumber an 
army as to make it move at a snail's pace. In Mexico, 
we think, all the operations were somewhat faulty in the 
above respects. The six months' camp at Corpus Christi 
gave that spirit and character to the army, which caused 
it to triumph in its subsequent advance. In the march of 
General Wool, from San Antonio to Parras, the troops made 
their usual marches each day, and did not lose a man. In 
Puebla, our troops preparing for the advance were assidu- 
ous in their military exercises ; but at Vera Cruz — Jalapa 
— Puebla — Mexico — they were quartered in cities. This 
was unavoidable at Vera Cruz, but not so at the other 
places ; and throughout it was admitted, that a Mexican 
army had a mobility which could not be given to its antag- 
onists. The Mexican troops are indeed remarkable for 
their rapid marches, and their patient endurance of hunger 
and fatigue. Ampudia, in four days, marched^a division 
from Monterey to Matamoras, 180 miles. Santa Anna, after 
concentrating his troops about Encarnacion, moved early on 
the morning of the 21st of February, and after marching a 
distance of 36 miles across a desert without food or water, 
and finding the American troops in retreat, pushed his 
wearied army forward and came in presence of General 
Taylor about mid-day on the 22d ; his advance having 
marched some fifty miles in thirty hours, though with dis- 
astrous loss, both in men and morale. A portion of these 
same troops made a counter-march of seven hundred miles, 
and in fifty-five days were in position at Cerro-Gordo. Yet, 
notwithstanding these facts, we have no hesitation in ex- 
pressing the conviction that, with the training we have in- 
dicated, an American army could be made to surpass the 
Mexicans, and indeed any army of ancient or modern times, 
in the rapidity of its marches, and in its patient endurance 
of all the toils of the campaign. But to attain this, a severe 
and constant discipline for many months is required ; and it 



EIO GKANDE AND OF MEXICO. 19 

should be made the point of honor with the soldier, to excel 
his enemy in every requisite to success. It is a question 
worthy of consideration, too, whether pack-mules could not 
have been chiefly relied upon, as a means of transportation 
in prosecuting the first advantages, leaving the wagon 
trains to bring forward the larger supplies subsequently. 
Great mobility, too, could have been given to the movable 
columns, by organizing an efficient mule train. Had the 
contest continued, there is no doubt we could have 
made ourselves as great a terror to the enemy by our 
rapid marches, and by falling upon him unawares, as 
in the pitched battles. 

We have already presented the military and political 
reasons for the march to the Rio Grande. General Taylor 
occupied a menacing position opposite Matamoras, and se- 
cured it by defensive works in the last days of April and 
the early days of May. The capture of Thornton's party 
left no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the Mexicans. 
General Taylor immediately made a requisition for five 
thousand troops. The country was thrown into the most 
intense anxiety for the safety of his command. But before 
reinforcements reached him, the enemy had been overcome 
in the well-contested fields of Palo Alto and Resaca, and 
driven across the Rio Grande. 

Referring to our author for the narrative of these battles, 
we will state that in our opinion he does not do justice to 
the sagacity, promptitude, and judgment of the American 
commander. It would be inferred that General Taylor was 
wanting in decision, and that he had been worked up to his 
duty by the more energetic counsels of younger officers. 
General Taylor's whole course was well weighed, and was 
pursued with the most indomitable resolution. Major Ripley 
states, that on the morning of the 9th General Taylor was 
doubtful as to the* propriety of an advance, and that, in conse- 
quence, he convened a council of war to discuss the ques- 



20 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

tion. This is an entire mistake. General Taylor never 
hesitated for one moment, and he called the council simply 
at the instance of one or two of the senior officers who were 
opposed to the step. This council never had the slightest 
weight with General Taylor, as is apparent from the fact, 
that a large majority of the officers were opposed to an ad- 
vance, and yet the advance was made. Moreover, it is 
stated, that only Duncan and Belknap were in favor of 
an advance. Justice to the dead requires it to be said that 
Cols. Macintosh and Martin Scott were equally strenu- 
ous in favor of an advance — two gallant men who subse- 
quently, on the bloody field of Molino, gave up their lives 
to their country. The march to the Rio Grande, the occu- 
pying a defensive position opposite Matamoras, and the re- 
turn to Point Isabel, were all important steps in the plan of 
maintaining American ascendency on the eastern bank of 
the Rio Grande. These flanking points made essentially 
secure, General Taylor marched directly forward to his ob- 
ject ; and we know not which most to admire, his cool and 
steady encounter of the enemy on the field of Palo Alto, 
or the extraordinary and terrible energy with which he 
sent his little force to the attack of the Resaca. The one 
gave confidence to his troops and prepared them for the 
other. 

Thus had the war unexpectedly arisen and been ush- 
ered in by the glorious victories of the Rio Grande. The 
necessary information upon which to base a large and sys- 
tematic campaign was not collected, nor were there the 
supplies and means of transportation to advance with vigor 
into the interior. But both the General and the Govern- 
ment were of opinion that no delay should occur in striking 
another blow at the enemy. The President was particu- 
larly desirous to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the na- 
tion, and accordingly a large number of troops was sent 
out to the theatre of war. And whilst, in reference to ulte- 



KIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 21 

rior operations, neither the authorities at Washington nor 
the General in the field were able at once to settle upon a 
practicable plan, they both came simultaneously to the con- 
clusion that Monterey, the capital of New Leon, the first 
position of strength on the highway to Mexico, and the 
key to the Northern provinces, should be promptly seized. 
It was hoped that when this was accomplished, the Mexi- 
can government would be ready to negotiate. 

But the administration did not appreciate the difficulty 
of moving troops in an enemy's country, and amidst a 
sparse and impoverished population ; nor did it consider 
that while it was an easy matter, with our immense 
steamboat facilities, to disembark reinforcements near the 
base of the Rio Grande, it was a work of time to organize 
the wagon trains to transport the same into the interior. 

It would seem, indeed, that while so much vigor was 
shown in transporting troops to the Rio Grande, very little 
was exhibited in furnishing the means for transporting 
them after their disembarkation. It was the duty of the 
authorities to see that the usual supplies, means of trans- 
portation, <fcc, were sent with them, leaving it simply to 
the General in the field to make requisitions for unusual 
supplies and means of transportation. Thus, while some 
twenty thousand volunteers were sent to the theatre of war, 
not a wagon reached the advance of Gen. Taylor till after 
the capture of Monterey. 

Gen. Taylor found himself in a situation of great em- 
barrassment. Availing himself of the Rio Grande for for- 
warding supplies and troops by steam to a new depot at 
Camargo, he saw himself obliged either to make the move- 
ment on Monterey with the trains that had accompanied 
his advance from Corpus Christi, when his force was less 
than three thousand men ; or else to defer his movement to 
so late a period, as to occasion serious dissatisfaction to 
the authorities at home. 



22 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

But the question of subsistence is a controlling one in 
the movement of armies, and all the information that was 
gained went to show that only about six thousand men 
could be subsisted in the country about Monterey; 
moreover, this was the maximum force for which the 
American general could transport the munitions of war 
and subsistence indispensable before the occupation of the 
country placed in his hands its resources. 

If, therefore, a movement were made at all, the column 
was necessarily restricted to that number, though a much 
larger force was at hand. Confident that it would be 
adequate to the single object of reducing Monterey, and 
concurring with the Government in the policy of vigorous- 
ly prosecuting operations, Gen. Taylor determined upon 
advancing. Having arrived before Monterey, on the 19th 
of September, a vigorous reconnaissance was ordered of the 
various approaches, which resulted in the determination of 
Gen. Taylor to occupy the Saltillo road by Worth's veteran 
division, holding the remainder of the army in position 
on the eastern side of the town. Previous to arriving be- 
fore Monterey, Gen. Taylor had contemplated a movement 
of this kind, with the view of intercepting reinforcements, 
and capturing the enemy's entire force. And, within twelve 
hours after his arrival, Major Mansfield, with a squadron 
of Texan horse, had gone over the whole distance to the 
Saltillo road, and had ascertained the entire practicability 
of the movement. 

On the Saltillo side of the town were the two imposing 
heights of the Independence and Federation, defended by 
the respective works of the Bishop's Palace and old Fort 
Soldado. The possession of these works made certain the 
reduction of the city. Worth was put in movement on 
the 20th, and, to distract the enemy's attention, the remain- 
der of the army was displayed on the eastern front of the 
city. Worth encamped about three miles from the Saltillo 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 23 

road, and at daybreak the next morning resumed his 
march. After a sharp skirmish at the junction of the Sal- 
tillo road with the one he was pursuing, the enemy was 
repulsed and the Saltillo road was gained. Putting his 
train in a secure position on the Saltillo road, and disposing 
his troops for its protection, he made his arrangements to 
storm the heights of the Federation. Suffice it to say, that it 
met with the most complete success. Capt. C. F. Smith 
conducted the front attack against the heights with a 
chosen body of 300 men, while Col. P. F. Smith, with the 
5th and 7th Infantry, directed another more to the south and 
west, directly against Fort Soldado itself. Col. Smith's 
movement, made on his own responsibility, against the 
Soldado, was in happy conjunction with that of Capt. 
Smith, made somewhat earlier, against the highest point, 
of the Federation. The garrison of Soldado, shaken by 
Capt. Smith's appearance on this height, was in no condi- 
tion to resist the charge of the 5th and 7th. But before 
Worth's stormers had crowned the height of the Federation, 
the other side of Monterey had been penetrated, and a de- 
cisive triumph had been achieved over the main bulk of 
the enemy's force. 

On the northern and eastern fronts of the city the 
ground was low, and the view obstructed by corn and 
chaparral. On the morning of the 21st, Gen. Taylor 
displayed his whole command, and ordered forward Major 
Mansfield and three battalions of Twiggs' division under 
Garland, to make a close reconnaissance of the enemy's 
works, and, if circumstances favored, to seize a position in 
the city itself. In the execution of this order, Mansfield, 
supported by two companies of Garland's command, cau- 
tiously advanced, and came upon an abandoned field-work, 
at only a stone's throw from some deserted stone houses in 
the suburbs, affording excellent cover for troops, and appa- 
rently giving access to the gorge of a redoubt on the ex- 



24 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

treme left. This redoubt, called the Tannery Redoubt, was 
the key-point of the enemy's defences on this front of attack, 
and its possession was indispensable to the effective prose- 
cution of operations. 

Word was now sent to Garland to come on, and Mans- 
field moved down the street in search of a way to move to 
the left on the gorge. Before this was accomplished the 
whole command of Garland came into the suburb on the 
run, without suffering material'loss, and pushing eagerly for- 
ward, became exposed to a severe fire from masked batteries 
beyond the San Juan. Mansfield still advanced with the 
companies of Backus and Lamotte, and a position was taken 
in a tannery, whence a severe fire was directed upon the 
gorge of the redoubt and upon another tannery which pro- 
tected this gorge. But this attack was not supported, and 
Garland's command was withdrawn out of range, at the 
very moment the 4th Infantry and three regiments of 
volunteers under General Butler were sent to its support. 
These troops gallantly advanced upon the tannery redoubt ; 
and its garrison, all the while severely pelted by Backus and 
Lamotte, immediately took to flight and crossed the San 
Juan. Operations were still further prosecuted, and attempts 
were made to storm the Tete de Pont, and a redoubt to the 
left of the tannery redoubt, but after experiencing considera- 
ble loss they were abandoned. No further attempts were 
made to effect a lodgment in the streets of the city. Gar- 
land's command was stationed as a guard to the tannery 
redoubt, and the remainder of the troops were withdrawn 
to the camp of San Domingo. This severe conflict, involv- 
ing a loss of 394 men, killed and wounded, completely with- 
drew the attention of the enemy from the western front, and 
opened the way for Worth's success. It covered the time 
occupied by Worth from his movement in the morning to 
his seizing the height of the Federation. 

On the 22d, Worth followed up his successes by the 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 25 

storming of the Independence, closely followed by that of 
the Bishop's Palace. On the eastern front, the body of the 
enemy occupied their position of the previous day, and 
poured a storm of fire upon the tannery redoubt. A road 
thereto from the camp was constructed, entirely sheltering 
the troops from the flank fire of the Citadel, except for about 
the last hundred yards. The strength of the tannery re- 
doubt itself was also increased by additional works. 

In the night of the 22d and 23d, the enemy concentrated 
the bulk of his troops in the vicinity of the main plaza, and 
on the morning of the 23d, the troops on the eastern front 
occupied several of the works in the vicinity of the tannery 
redoubt. General Taylor directed the cautious advance of 
Quitman into the city. Quitman, by 2 o'clock, had ap- 
proached to within a square of the plaza. But General 
Taylor, although he had been engaged full four hours, 
hearing up to this time nothing from Worth, concluded that 
no attack would be made by him during the day, and he 
accordingly withdrew the troops to the edge of the city, to 
concert a combined attack. Worth, notwithstanding, had 
been making his arrangements to attack the western portion 
of the city. He organized two parties, which, working from 
house to house with picks, made good every step of their 
advance. Towards nightfall Worth established the mortar 
which had been sent round from the other front, within ef- 
fective distance of the heart of the city, and threw a shell 
into the main plaza every twenty minutes during the night. 

On the morning of the 24th, a proposition to capitulate 
was submitted by Ampudia to the American General, and 
after several meetings on the part of Commissioners from 
the two parties, terms were agreed upon. The city and the 
military stores of the Mexican army were turned over to 
the Americans ; the garrison marched out with the honors 
of war, retaining their arms and a field battery of six 
pieces ; and an armistice of eight weeks was agreed 



26 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

upon, subject to the approval of the respective govern- 
ments. 

Commending Major Ripley's narrative as in the main 
a perspicuous, graphic, and faithful account of these opera- 
tions, we will express our dissent from some of his military 
views. In his criticisms upon these operations, he influ- 
ence of the operations of General Worth are unduly mag- 
nified at the expense of those on the eastern front ; thus 
enhancing the military reputation of General Worth, 
at the expense of that of General Taylor. General 
Worth in command of a division, and charged with an in- 
dependent and most important operation, exhibited great 
skill and good conduct. He showed admirable executive 
qualities ; care in providing for the safety of his trains, pre- 
cautions against surprise, and skill in preparation for his 
multifarious enterprises. His combinations for carrying the 
heights of the Federation and Fort Soldado, the heights 
of the Independence and the Bishop's palace, were happily 
conceived, and boldly executed. Too much praise can- 
not be ascribed to his cautious, and yet sustained vigorous 
advance into the city. 

But it must be borne in mind, that it was General Tay- 
lor to whom the merit of the conception of this flank move- 
ment of Worth was due, and that, thoroughly understand- 
ing the character of his enemy, he omitted no precaution to 
secure its complete success. His bold attack upon the city 
on the morning of the 21st, gaining an important work, and 
his unflinching attitude throughout that day, and the suc- 
ceeding day, in the teeth of the main force of the enemy 
and under the incessant fire of his heavy guns, not only 
was Worth's safety on the Saltillo road, but it absolutely 
disgarnished that quarter of the city of a great portion of 
its defenders, and required of Worth at no time to put forth 
half the strength of his division. This combined move- 
ment against the common enemy, caused all the heights and 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 27 

defences 'of the western front to fall into the hands of 
Worth, with small loss to his division. 

Moreover, on the 23d, Gen. Taylor, by his early, bold, 
and consecutive movements, continued to withdraw the 
enemy's attention from Worth, and enabled the latter 
to establish himself securely in the western suburb of the 
city, without seriously encountering the enemy. Though 
we think Gen. Worth deserving of censure for his pro- 
crastination in responding to Taylor's attack in the early 
part of the day, he is to be commended highly for 
continuing his advance in the latter portion, after Taylor's 
fire had ceased and his troops had been withdrawn. It 
must also be admitted, that, as regards the details of opera- 
tions in the city, the eastern attack was not characterized 
by the skill and caution of the western attack. Thus, on 
the 21st, we think, there were movements subsequent to 
the taking of the tannery redoubt, which were unneces- 
sarily rash and headlong, and that the suburb previously 
occupied should have been subsequently held and se- 
cured by works. We think the mortar, instead of having 
been sent round to Worth, should have been established in 
that redoubt immediately on its fall. Shells thrown there- 
from into the enemy's lines, would have done much towards 
silencing his fire on the 22d. Instead of restricting ope- 
rations on the 22d to the occupation and strengthening of 
the works of the tannery redoubt, ground northward and 
westward should have been gained and secured by lodg- 
ments, with a view of opening a communication with 
Worth and of isolating the citadel. 

On the third day, Worth being in possession of the oppo- 
site heights, and the way being open for his entrance into 
the city, Gen. Taylor should early have sent an order to 
Worth to advance with promptitude. There would have 
been no difficulty in sending the order. At all events, his 
own troops should not have been withdrawn. With early 



28 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

notice sent to Worth, and decisive orders for his prompt 
advance, a communication must have been established to- 
wards night. 

Exposed as Gen. Taylor's column was to the close fire 
of the enemy's main force, it was important that his suc- 
cessive advances should have been secured by works. 

We will remark, however, there was a great deficiency 
of intrenching tools, due to the limited amount of trans- 
portation, and that all the operations at Monterey were 
greatly influenced, both by this cause and the entire want 
of breaching guns. 

Major Ripley enlarges much upon the dangerous char- 
acter of the flank movement executed by Worth. To 
which we reply : Gen. Taylor knew his enemy ; he also 
knew the reliable character of Worth and Worth's division. 
The operation promised large results, without hazard of 
disaster or unnecessary loss. It was made perfectly 
safe by Taylor's prompt conduct in first displaying 
his troops, and sending large corps of cavalry towards the 
western suburb, with orders even to charge through the 
open streets, should circumstances favor, whilst Worth was 
in movement ; and, second, in his stern attack on the city, 
while Worth was making his dispositions to do the work 
assigned to him. 

Major Ripley also censures the eastern attack, for 
being made under the flank fire of the citadel, and with- 
out a proper knowledge of the ground. To which we 
reply : The citadel was a strong field-work, defended 
by a formidable stone keep. Two breaching guns, de- 
signed for the attack on the city, had been left be- 
hind, in consequence of the small amount of transportation 
rendering it utterly impossible to take them along. The 
enemy were greatly superior in heavy guns. The citadel 
could only have been taken by an infantry assault, which 
would have been, in a military sense, almost madness, and 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 29 

could only have succeeded at at an enormous sacrifice of 
life. Time pressed. Boldness and rapidity could alone 
insure success. The safety of the army was in decided 
action and in prompt results ; although some loss and some 
hazard were incurred in disregarding the citadel, there 
would have been more by delaying the attack on the city 
and carrying the citadel. It was impossible to get information 
of the eastern works, without bringing a portion of the com- 
mand into action ; and though the ardor of the troops 
brought the whole force of Garland into close action before 
the reconnaissance was accomplished, it may be just cause 
for censuring subordinates, but not the directing general. 
Taylor's orders to Garland and to Mansfield to examine 
the enemy's position, and, if circumstances favored, to 
seize a point in the city, we pronounce to be emphatically 
wise and proper. His promptitude, on hearing the report 
of arms, in advancing the remainder of his troops, saved 
Backus in his gallant stand in rear of the tannery redoubt, 
entirely isolated in consequence of the withdrawal of Gar- 
land, and resulted in wresting a strong position from the 
enemy, and driving him beyond the San Juan. His gene- 
ral dispositions and orders were just and urgently demand- 
ed, in view of the movement of Worth. 

We cannot see how General Taylor could have made a 
better general plan for his operations against Monterey, 
or a better general disposition of his troops. Nor will 
it be denied that his operations as a whole were character- 
ized by vigor, boldness, and judgment. Upon these 
considerations must rest the vindication of his qualities as 
a commander. 

We now come to the capitulation of Monterey, and 
feel bound to express our entire dissent from Major Rip- 
ley's views. 

General Taylor, though in the first instance disposed to 
insist upon the surrender of the Mexican army as prisoners 



30 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

of war, finally agreed to the capitulation for the following 
reasons : 

1. His army was not large enough to make a complete 
investment of the city, and he could not prevent the enemy 
evacuating it during the night. 

2. He was assured by General Ampudia that the new 
Mexican administration was favorable to negotiations, and 
he was induced to grant the mild terms of the capitulation 
providing for an eight weeks' armistice, in the belief that it 
would be an auspicious entering upon a more friendly in- 
tercourse between the two governments, and would end in 
a treaty of peace. 

3. Considerations of humanity to non-combatants. 
The difficulty with Major Ripley's criticisms, as indeed 

with the criticisms of all who have censured General Tay- 
lor for this capitulation, is, that in discussing the terms and 
measuring the advantages of the capitulation, sight has 
been lost of the fact that a most signal triumph was 
achieved, and an important point gained. The Mexicans, 
in agreeing to a capitulation, acknowledged most signifi- 
cantly the prowess of the American army. The expedition 
was limited to six thousand men, for the simple reason that 
a larger force could not be transported to, and subsisted in 
the valley of the San Juan. It is admitted, that a more 
formidable resistance was encountered than was anticipated. 
Does this sustain our author's statement, that the expe- 
dition was chiefly an experiment on the agricultural ca- 
pacity of the San Juan ; that its object was statistical 
and not military ? This idea has its refutation in the bold, 
prompt, resolute going to work of the American General ; 
in his stern, vigorous blows, compelling the enemy to seek 
the cover of his works on the first day of the attack ; and 
in all his subsequent movements. We think that General 
Taylor deserves high praise for his vigor and foresight in 
so prosecuting operations, that the enemy agreed to ca- 



EIO GEAJSTDE AND OF MEXICO. 81 

pitulate, instead of resorting to the evacuation of the 
city. 

The real alternative is this : did General Taylor judge 
rightly as a military man, and therefore does he deserve 
well of his country for advancing when he did ad- 
vance, and accomplishing what he did accomplish? Or 
ought he to have remained on the Rio Grande four to 
six weeks longer, in order that he might organize the neces- 
sary means to raise his expedition to 10,000 or 12,000 men ? 
This, it seems to us, is the real and only alternative. 

The result therefore of the operations against Monterey 
was its capitulation, and the withdrawal of the Mexican 
force. But in consequence of the known fact that a change of 
administration had occurred in Mexico, and the assurances 
of the Mexican General that the new rulers were friendly 
to negotiations, the political measure of an eight weeks' 
armistice was determined upon, for the purpose of giving 
the Mexican Government an opportunity to treat for peace. 
Major Ripley errs in treating this armistice as a military 
necessity, growing out of the inadequate means of the Amer- 
ican General ; whereas it was a question of state, which, 
under the new circumstances of the case, General Taylor 
felt authorized to entertain ; and to entertain the more 
readily, because it could not interfere in the slightest degree 
with a forward movement, the alternative of failure in ne- 
gotiations, and to prepare for which he well knew would 
require the whole period covered by the armistice. 

The practical sagacity of General Taylor in this mea- 
sure is displayed in his never having for a moment intermit- 
ted his exertions to prepare for the advance, and in the 
armistice itself never having paralyzed in the least his 
operations. 

Although we think it probable that the Mexican army 
would have surrendered prisoners of war, we neverthe- 
less think that General Taylor acted wisely in agreeing to 



32 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

the capitulation. He could not have foreseen Mexican facili- 
ty in giving assurances that were not to be fulfilled. Our ob- 
ject was to conquer a peace. How could this be accom- 
plished if we rejected all overtures from the enemy, on the 
ground they could not be trusted ? With such a principle 
we might have subjugated the country, but manifestly it 
would have been impossible to treat for peace. 

About the time of the reduction of Monterey, the Govern- 
ment was directing its attention to operations in another 
quarter, and our author, in his endeavor to account for the 
policy of initiating the Vera Cruz expedition, has in our 
judgment fairly presented neither the military views and 
recommendations of Gen. Taylor, nor the main historical 
facts of this most interesting period of the Mexican war. 
In general terms, he sets forth the statement that Gen. 
Taylor, in reply to the many inquiries of the Government as 
to the proper mode of prosecuting operations, was deficient 
in enlarged views ; that his counsels were simply limited to 
objections ; and that the Administration, finding they could 
get nothing out of him, were obliged to act without regard 
to him. The facts are simply these. Their simple reca- 
pitulation will show the important part played by Gen. 
Taylor even in the Vera Cruz expedition, and the concur- 
rence of opinion that subsisted between Marcy, Scott, and 
Taylor, in reference to setting on foot and prosecuting that 
expedition. We will give them without reference to autho- 
rities, but we challenge contradiction. 

Gen. Taylor from the outset was of opinion, that opera- 
tions from the Rio Grande should be restricted to cutting off 
the Northern Provinces. In reference to the simple opera- 
tion of reducing Monterey, he was uniformly of opinion 
that six thousand men were adequate. Whether San Louis 
Potosi should be included under the general class of North- 
ern Provinces, he declined giving an opinion, till more 
accurate information could be gained by advancing upon 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 35 

and reducing Monterey. Previous to the advance to Monte- 
rey, he had thought it probable that a column of 10,000 
men advanced to San Louis Potosi would bring proposals 
of peace, but after the advance he was of opinion that 20,000 
men would be requisite — that this number could not be 
pushed forward — that this advance must be abandoned and 
a defensive line occupied, — and that the decisive blow must 
be struck against the capital from the neighborhood of 
Vera Cruz. He early expressed the opinion that a move- 
ment upon the capital from Tampico was impracticable. 
The Secretary on his part concurred fully in the opinion, 
early expressed and uniformly maintained, as to the extent 
of operations from the base of the Rio Grande. He shared 
equally with the general, his hopes and his fears in reference 
to an advance upon San Louis Potosi. He hoped, as did 
the general, that such an advance might be practicable, and 
that it might terminate the war. Both the Secretary and 
the General, when it was seen that the change of Govern- 
ment brought with it no hopes of negotiating a peace, came 
to the conclusion that the decisive blow against Mexico 
should not be struck from the Northern line. Their respec- 
tive letters announcing this conclusion passed each other on 
their way to their several destinations. This change of 
rulers was a grand political element that controlled the 
military operations. Major Ripley will find in this new 
element a conclusive reason for the change of opinion of 
Gen. Taylor, after the reduction of Monterey, as to the force 
that would be adequate to occupy San Louis Potosi. In 
August, when, he expressed the opinion that 10,000 men 
were adequate, it was believed the Northern Provinces, in- 
cluding San Louis Potosi, were hostile to the general govern- 
ment, and would be disposed to welcome our advance. In 
October, affairs were entirely changed. The Government 
had gone into the hands of more energetic rulers, and the 
3 



34 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

whole country was united in one sentiment of hostility 
and resistance to American conquest. 

The War Department, in a dispatch to Gen. Taylor of 
the 22d September, announced the rejection of overtures for 
negotiating a peace by the Mexican Government, and the 
determination of the American Government to prosecute the 
contest with vigor, and on the 22d October that an expe- 
dition against Vera Cruz was resolved upon. At this time 
no ulterior views beyond the reduction of Vera Cruz seem 
to have been entertained by the Secretary, and 4000 men 
was the force suggested as adequate to this service in con- 
nection with the navy. But for definite and large views, 
both as regards the whole field of operations in Mexico, and 
the particular objects and organization of this expedition, 
the country is mainly indebted to Gen. Scott. He now 
seems to have been taken into the confidence of the Govern- 
ment. In a memoir addressed to the Secretary on the 27th 
October, he showed that the possession of Vera Cruz and 
its castle, as a step towards compelling Mexico to sue for 
peace, was of no value, unless promptly followed by a 
march upon the capital. Ten thousand men he deemed 
the minimum force to attempt the reduction of the city, to 
be increased to 20,000 men on opening the campaign. In 
subsequent memoirs of the 12th and 16th November, he 
proposed prosecuting a great campaign with 30,000 effectives, 
to be organized in advance of Monterey and at Vera Cruz, 
in two columns of ten and twenty thousand men. and to 
operate respectively upon San Louis Potosi, and the capital. 
These memoirs are masterly. We think no one need do 
more than carefully read them to satisfy himself why the 
Government a few days afterwards sent the Commander-in- 
Chief of the army to the field, with full powers to organize 
both lines according to his own best judgment. And it 
was not till this decisive step had been taken, that the 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 35 

Government was placed in possession of Gen. Taylor's plan 
of the campaign ; which was to assume a defensive attitude 
on the northern line, and to strike the decisive blow from 
Vera Cruz on the Capital with an army of 25,000 men. 

Gen. Scott's plan we deem admirably adapted to the 
present conjuncture of affairs in Mexico. The great leader 
of Mexico was now at the head of its armies. Ten thou- 
sand effectives in advance of Monterey would have resisted 
any offensive movements, with the large force he was now 
organizing at San Louis Potosi. If Santa Anna remained 
in observation at San Louis Potosi, Gen. Scott would have 
advanced almost unresisted upon the capital. If he de- 
tached, and he must have detached largely if he detached 
at all, Gen. Taylor would have advanced almost unresisted 
upon San Louis Potosi. And with 20,000 men, Gen. Scott 
could have overcome any Mexican force, whether in the 
open field, or behind defensive works. Detachments would 
probably have been made, and the whole Mexican army, 
and the two strong points of the North and the South of 
Mexico, would have succumbed to -our arms. Menacing 
columns operating from these points must have prevented 
any further organization of the public force of Mexico, and 
no alternative would have remained than to sue for peace. 
The question was emphatically one of moral ascendancy, 
and bold consecutive movements on two converging lines 
were calculated to produce the greatest impression on the 
excitable Mexican mind. 

General Taylor's plan we deem an eminently safe and 
practicable plan — and though not so imposing and complete 
as that of General Scott, and not calculated to produce as 
large results, yet requiring a smaller force, it was more in 
accordance with the state of American preparation, and was 
in the sequel adopted. 

We prefer obvious, simple, natural explanations of acts 



36 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

and motives to possible hypotheses, however ingenious they 
may be. And therefore we do not believe with Major Rip- 
ley, that as regards Scott and Taylor, the question had 
now become personal ; that each was fixed on his own 
special part without reference to the general good. We do 
not believe that General Scott went to the field to play a 
monopolizing part ; nor do we believe that General Tay- 
lor had a thought that did not harmonize with the most 
single-minded devotion to his duty and his country. 

The administration was impelled to its course by high 

national considerations. It was its paramount duty, as it 

was its evident interest, to organize victory. A crisis had 

indeed occurred, demanding that all the military ability of 

the country should be applied to the direction of its military 

force. The presence of General Taylor on the northern 

line was needed whilst the Vera Cruz expedition was going 

forward. A strong force was assembling in his front, and 

whether our troops operated offensively, or remained in 

observation, a wary and experienced commander, having a 

knowledge of the country and possessing the confidence of 

his troops, was imperiously required. What other course 

could the administration have taken than to send Scott to 

the new field, and continue Taylor in the command which 

he had so long and so ably filled ? 

To organize this campaign, nine additional regiments 
of volunteers had then been called out. 20,500 effectives 
was General Taylor's estimated force. General Scott pro- 
posed detaching 4,000 regulars and 5,500 volunteers from 
the northern line for the expedition against Vera Cruz-r- 
leaving 11,000 men to General Taylor, and 8,000 for a 
movable column in advance of Monterey. Two thousand 
two hundred and fifty new volunteers sent to the northern 
line would increase this movable column to more than 
10,000. His own force — 9,500 men drawn from General 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 37 

Taylor, 4,500 new volunteers and 1000 sailors and marines 
adequate to the reduction of Vera Cruz — was to be in- 
creased to 20,000 effectives by new regiments of regulars 
in season for a movement into the interior. 

Throughout the Mexican war the effective force in the 
field was greatly overrated. Nor was the estimate of Gen- 
eral Scott an exception to this fact. Thus General Tay- 
lor's effective force did not exceed at the moment of writing 
this memoir 16,000 men. 

The toils and hardships of the first campaign, without 
including casualties in battle, will, in a distant and untried 
theatre, reduce the effective force of regulars to three-fourths 
or four-fifths, and of volunteers to one-half or two-thirds 
of the original number. To have insured a column of 
10,000 effectives in advance of Monterey, and one of 20,000 
throughout the Vera Cruz campaign, estimating the force 
to keep open the northern line at 3,000 men, required an 
additional force of 10,000 volunteers and 12,000 regulars. 
And 15,000 additional volunteers would have been required 
to supply the places of the twelve months' men, whose 
terms of service would expire before midsummer, and who 
could not be expected to re-enlist, and giving an aggregate 
of 25,000 volunteers and 12,000 regulars. The force actu- 
ally called out was 8,000 volunteers, and 8,500 regulars. 
We do not take into the account 6,500 volunteers called out 
in April, and at so late a period as neither to be able to 
supply the place of the discharged volunteers till months 
after their return, nor to be of any use in the campaign in 
question. 

With such inadequate means therefore was the govern- 
ment proposing to conduct a large campaign. And the 
consequence was that the shock of battle had to be borne 
by half the numbers originally contemplated. Great risk 
of disaster was incurred on both lines. Impossibilities 



38 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

almost were attempted, and impossibilities almost were 
achieved. 

Meanwhile, General Taylor proceeded to organize his 
defensive line. Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, was seized. 
The Chihuahua expedition was abandoned, and General 
Wool was placed in position at Parras, and early in Janua- 
ry, General Taylor brought together a force of five thou- 
sand three hundred men at Victoria, the capital of Ta- 
maulipas, to occupy that position, examine the passes of the 
mountains, and have in readiness two thousand regulars 
and two thousand volunteers for the Vera Cruz expedition. 
On the 15th of January, he received General Scott's letters 
of the 3d inst., addressed respectively to himself and Gen- 
eral Butler, directing 9000 men to be detached for this pur- 
pose. The occupation of Victoria was abandoned, and all 
the troops were sent to Tampico, save the escort required by 
the General to accompany his return to Monterey. 

General Scott, on reaching Camargo on the 3d of Janu- 
ary, estimated General Taylor's force at 7000 regulars and 
10,000 volunteers, and deeming 2000 regulars and 5000 
volunteers sufficient to occupy a defensive line, he proposed, 
detaching 4500 regulars, 4500 volunteers, and two field 
batteries, leaving to General Taylor 2500 regulars and 
5500 volunteers. The troops actually placed at his dis- 
posal, General Butler acting from information somewhat im- 
perfect in reference to the number of regular and volunteer 
troops at Victoria and Tampico, were, in round numberSj 
Gen. Worth's column 2,700 strong, and Gen. Patterson's at 
Tampico 6,000 strong, or about 5,100 regulars and 3,600 
volunteers, leaving to Gen. Taylor less than a thousand 
regulars and 7,300 volunteers ; of which one company of 
artillery and the Maryland battalion were left in garrison 
at Tampico, and giving to the Northern line proper, say 
900 regulars and 7000 volunteers, an aggregate of 7,900 
men. 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 39 

Thus, though the aggregate force rather exceeded Gen. 
Scott's estimate of what was needed to defend the line, 
there was not so large a regular force as was desirable or as 
Gen. Scott in the first instance contemplated. At the in- 
stance of the War Department and in view of the character 
of the force, Gen. Scott strongly advised Gen. Taylor to re- 
tire upon the defensive position of Monterey. 

The problem to be solved was a somewhat difficult one, 
and it must be admitted that neither of the American Gene- 
rals found its complete solution. 

Both were of opinion, up to the last moment, that Gen. 
Santa Anna would countermarch, and resist the landing at 
Vera Cruz ; yet both saw the necessity of providing against 
an advance movement from St. Louis — Gen. Scott by ad- 
vising the retiring upon Monterey, and making the stand 
with the aid of its strong defences ; Gen. Taylor by advanc- 
ing and assuming a threatening attitude at the very edge 
of the desert, and giving battle before the enemy could 
recover from the fatigue of his exhausting marches. 

Scott's plan, whilst it insured the safety of Gen. Taylor's 
command, exposed his own enterprise to imminent peril. 
Had Gen. Taylor retired upon Monterey, Santa Anna would 
not have followed him. Against its strong defences with 
an army of six thousand five hundred men, he could have 
made no impression. But Saltillo abandoned, Santa Anna 
could have so exalted the impressionable Mexican mind 
that, leaving Taylor intact, and rapidly countermarching ) 
he could have brought 40,000 men into the lines of Cerro 
Gordo. Santa Anna even coined a victory out of the sad 
retreat from Buena Vista. What could he not have done, 
coming back to the Capital as the deliverer of the State of 
Coahuila ? For these reasons we consider Gen. Scott's plan 
of retiring upon Monterey as equivalent to a defeat, and 
that the abandonment of the Vera Cruz expedition would 
have been infinitely preferable. 



40 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

We think, therefore, that Gen. Taylor judged rightly in 
holding his position in advance of Saltillo. It maintained 
the prestige of the American arms, and was worth all the 
risk incurred. 

The truth was, our means were entirely inadequate to 
maintain our acquisitions on the Northern line, and to open 
a new line of operations. Could the delays in raising the 
new volunteers and regulars have been foreseen, we think 
the decision should have been to restrict operations to the 
Northern line. The amount of transportation collected on 
that line was already large, — 1200 wagons. It could in 
two months have been largely increased. The country 
would no doubt have furnished several thousand pack 
mules. Three thousand actually accompanied the march 
to Monterey. The effect of a movement on San Louis 
would have been to relieve our rear. Santa Anna would 
have called in his advanced parties to its defence. Fifteen 
hundred men could in the first instance have maintained 
•our whole rear from Tampico to Saltillo. 

Early in March, with simply the diligence exhibited 
throughout this campaign, the advance could have been 
made from Saltillo with 19,000 men with ample means of 
transportation, and the great battle of the war could have 
been fought under the walls of San Louis Potosi. In the 
mean time the remaining regiments of new volunteers could 
have sufficiently increased the force in rear, and converged 
a large train for the troops at San Louis by the circuitous 
route of Monterey. Tampico could have been made in 
part the base, the mule-paths leading thence to San Louis 
serving for the reinforcements of foot and transportation by 
pack mules. With scarcely a pause in its movement, our 
army could have advanced upon the capital, leaving a 
large garrison at Q,ueretaro. Thus in forty or fifty days 
from the movement in advance of Saltillo, the whole centre 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 41 

of the country could have been firmly seized and the enemy 
been reduced to sue for peace. Had he still held out, the 
line with Vera Cruz could have been operied in the fall. 

Thus, operating on this long, circuitous and difficult 
line would have been safer and more practicable than were 
the operations on the Vera Cruz line, in consequence of the 
utter inadequacy of our means. Nor could the army have 
possibly been involved in any conflict with the enemy of 
the fearful character of the great contest of Buena Vista, 
or the terrible battles of Mexico. 

Both the Secretary and General Scott indulged the 
hope, that the two columns would at least be raised to 
20,000 men, and that the capital and San Luis would have 
been seized, and a peace have been conquered by the time 
the terms of service of the old volunteers had expired. 
General Scott left Washington with this confident belief. 
His plan of the campaign was an admirable one, and 
promised large results. He was unwilling to relinquish it, 
notwithstanding that from day to day, the inadequacy of 
his means became more and more apparent. He persevered, 
and success on both lines crowned our arms. 

This result was due, under Providence, to the qualities 
of our two leaders. General Taylor, left with a force sim- 
ply adequate to maintain a defensive position at Monterey, 
determined to surrender none of his acquisitions. His bold 
position at the edge of the desert in advance of Saltillo, 
invites the attack of the Mexican leader, and the conse- 
quence is, that that admirable army, the best Mexico ever 
saw, is defeated, demoralized, and reduced to half its origi- 
nal numbers. This was the most effective aid rendered to 
the Vera Cruz expedition. Had it not been for the battle 
of Buena Vista, Scott could not have advanced upon the 
capital. 

Nor was Scott's undertaking less bold and dangerous. 



42 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

He approached Vera Cruz in the full expectation of finding 
Santa Anna ready to receive him with an army of 20,000 
or 30,000 men. His own force did not exceed 13,000, and 
it is a matter of record, that he was determined to attempt 
the landing with 8,000, whatever force might be opposed to 
him. Thanks to the events on the northern line, his land- 
ing was unresisted. 

Yet we find that, delayed for many months by the want 
of troops, and after a preparation for resistance even greater 
than what he had anticipated, he finally advances upon 
the capital with 10,000 instead of 20,000 men. 

The event shows that the distribution made by Scott 
was most fortunate. Five hundred more men could not 
have made the victory of Buena Vista more decisive. It 
might have made the valley of Mexico the magnificent 
mausoleum of the American army. Be it remembered, it 
was the large, profound, disinterested view of his field of 
operations by General Taylor, his noble confidence in him- 
self, his extraordinary soundness of judgment and energy 
of will, that led to meeting the enemy on that memorable 
.field, and that led to that signal triumph. It was the genius 
and enterprise, the indomitable resolution and heroic spirit 
of Scott, that led to the advance upon and capture of Mex- 
ico. 

Whilst General Scott was organizing his own expedi- 
tion, and Taylor was maintaining his defensive attitude in 
advance of Saltillo, General Santa Anna, the American 
plan having been discovered to him by the capture of Gen- 
eral Scott's dispatches of January 3d, resolved upon a 
campaign equalling in greatness of conception the most 
masterly of Frederick's, and which, had it been successful, 
would have placed him high on the roll of the masters of 
the military art. It was to launch his whole force in suc- 
cession against the two columns into which our army was 
now divided, and by one great effort, to drive from the soil 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 43 

of Mexico the armies of her invaders. It being doubtful 
whether he could reach Vera Cruz in season to resist the 
landing of General Scott's column, his first movement was 
of necessity against General Taylor. No where else could 
he be so sure of bringing a preponderating force to bear 
upon his enemy. 

The great want of Mexico was a victory, and the resto- 
ration of her moral power. The northern line broken up, 
and the American army driven beyond the Rio Grande, the 
full deliverance of Mexico would have been wrought. One 
victory achieved, the memory of former defeats would have 
been wiped away, and Mexico would have been placed in a 
position stronger than the one she occupied before the battle of 
the Rio Grande. The whole nation would have been raised 
to the highest pitch of enthusiasm ; and the column mov- 
ing upon the capital would have had to encounter, in firm 
and disciplined array, the entire military strength of Mex- 
ico, directed by its great chief. The veterans of the North, 
flushed with recent victory, would have given confidence 
to every soldier of the line, and the whole army would 
have been an army of veterans. Thus this movement 
was the great bow of promise to Mexico, and we think the 
Mexican general, if he determined to resist at all, could 
not, in any other way, have so wisely applied his force. 

It was the misfortune of Mexico throughout this war to 
be beaten, and the vindication of this movement consists 
in the fact, that it was the only one which came near be- 
ing successful. Buena Yista was won by policy, by skill, 
by fortune. It was General Taylor's bold attitude for sev- 
eral weeks at Agua Nueva that restored confidence to his 
own troops, shaken by many previous rumors, and that 
imparted to them additional skill and discipline. It was 
his apparently precipitate retreat from this position, that 
lured the Mexicans on to that unprepared attack, with 
troops exhausted by fifty miles continuous march, still suf- 



4A CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

fering from thirst and hunger. It was that clear eye that 
saw that here must the victory be achieved if achieved at 
all — that iron will that would not swerve from this convic- 
tion — that unabated confidence that all would yet go well, 
that made our troops so nobly sustain their chief. All 
these have made Buena Vista the pride of every patriot 
and the theme of history. 

We do not propose to go into any further detail in rela- 
tion to the battle of Buena Vista. With such evidence, on 
all sides, of the great ability of the general in chief com- 
mand, the large facts all thoroughly weighed and all cor- 
rectly understood, we have really not the space in this brief 
article to notice errors of detail. No doubt many occurred, 
and we have yet to learn that battles can be fought and 
won even without the commission of large errors. 

We accord to our author the general accuracy in his 
narrative of these operations, and we approve of many of 
his military criticisms. 

We think he has stated with great force and eloquence 
the reasons for Santa Anna's march upon Gen. Taylor, and 
we concur in his. general views as to the defensive line. 
Our troops were too much disseminated. Wool's force 
should have been drawn in from Parras and a threatening 
attitude assumed at Agua Nueva immediately on the oc- 
cupation of Saltillo. Had the war sunk into a quasi peace, 
as was proposed by many of our public men, by the occu- 
pation of a defensive line, we think San Louis Potosi should 
have been seized as essential to its security. It was the 
key-point of the whole line. It was not essential however, 
after the Vera Cruz line had been opened and the attention 
of the enemy had been fixed in that direction. 

We think, however, the author does injustice to both 
Generals in asserting that the resources of the country was 
the bone of contention between them: that their views 
were partial, and that each was fixed on his own line. On 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 45 

the contrary, their whole course was of a very different 
character. 

It is admitted that they did not altogether foresee the 
future, and that in particular they did not appreciate the 
1 consummate ability of Santa Anna. Yet we find a remarka- 
ble disinterestedness on the part of both. Taylor advised 
the suspension of offensive operations on his own line where 
he had every thing to gain, and the opening of a new line, 
where the victor's crown was to be placed on the brow of 
another. Scott anxiously sought the safety of the com- 
mand of Taylor, preferring to expose his own force to the 
jeopardy and disaster involved in the change of the plan 
of campaign. We have given our reasons why we think 
Gen. Scott erred in advising a withdrawal to Monterey, and 
why we consider Taylor's course was more fortunate for 
his country. A careful examination will show that Scott 
acted in' a most generous and disinterested spirit. This 
view is confirmed by his course, when he believed Santa 
Anna was in movement from San Louis to meet him at 
Vera Cruz — a movement which most assuredly, in our 
opinion, would have been made had Taylor retired to 
Monterey. He must have believed his own enterprise diffi- 
cult and his own force inadequate, yet we find him making 
no further detachments from Taylor's command, but on the 
contrary his aim was to reinforce Gen. Taylor by new regi- 
ments of volunteers, to enable him to assume the offensive. 
We see throughout a great anxiety on the part of Scott to 
leave sufficient troops with Taylor to enable him thus to 
act. Gen. Scott was true throughout to his original plan of 
the campaign, wherein Taylor was to act a conspicuous 
part. 

The evidences which our author adduces to establish 
the fact that General Taylor was governed by per- 
sonal views proves to our mind the very reverse. Taylor 
did feel aggrieved in seeing 9,000 troops detached from his 



46 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

command, without any previous consultation, after he had 
reported that he could not spare more than 4,000, and he 
must have been more than human, not to have felt ag- 
grieved. 

Yet it is remarkable with what singleness of purpose 
he at once adjusted himself to the new condition of things. 
In the words of Scripture, instead of looking back to the 
things that were behind, he pressed forward to the things 
that were before. It made him feel strong, and he there- 
fore announces to his government his ability to maintain 
his position. Such is the legitimate fruit of the spirit of 
self-abnegation — the true heroic spirit. Who dreamed at 
this time of advancing upon the capital with 10,000 men 7 
Yet it was done this same year by men raised in like man- 
ner to a consciousness of power and moved in like manner 
to the determination to exert it. 

Had General Taylor, after his troops were withdrawn, 
expended his strength in clamoring about it, instead of de- 
voting himself to his great work of maintaining his posi- 
tion, his former views would have been sustained by his 
own destruction. There is no inconsistency between his 
first opinion that only 4,000 men could be detached with 
safety to his command, and his subsequent expression of 
confidence, that though 9,000 men were detached, he could 
still maintain his line ; and in charging this upon General 
Taylor, we think our author has not shown that apprecia- 
tion of the influences of moral causes in shaping great 
events, which generally characterizes his work. 

Meanwhile General Scott was organizing his own expe- 
dition, and in March, landed in the vicinity of and invested 
Vera Cruz. But before proceeding with the narrative of 
his campaign, we feel bound to give certain extracts from 
dispatches in illustration of the spirit with which he en- 
tered upon his duties. We think the practical effect of 
Major Ripley's work is to represent General Scott as having 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 47 

rushed to the field simply to share the harvest of glory with 
Taylor, and to regain his former prestige before the people. 
His dispatches, however, give a very different aspect to the 
case. Their uniform tenor exhibits in the most convincing 
light the single-mindedness with which he sought to serve 
his country in the field, and the remarkable steadiness and 
force with which, in spite of manifold difficulties, he pushed 
forward to his object. They exhibit him in his true char- 
acter in times of emergency — a calm, steadfast, indomitable, 
enterprising, noble-minded man, whom his country should 
delight to honor, and whom posterity will not fail to revere. 
We extract as follows : 

Oct. 27th, 1846. — In a memoir to the Secretary of War, 
General Scott says : " An army of at least 10,000 men, con- 
s isting of cavalry, (say) 2,000 men ; artillery, (say) 600, 
and the remainder infantry. The whole of the artillery, 
and at least half of the cavalry and infantry, ought to be 
regular troops. * By this time, (say in 

the month of March) that army might be augmented to 
about 20,000 men for ulterior operations, by new regiments 
of regulars and volunteers." 

Nov. 12th, 1846.—" The minimum force, (10,000 men) 
then proposed, I still deem indispensable. Personally, I 
would be willing to attempt the capture of Vera Cruz and 
through it the castle of San Juan Ulloa with perhaps a 
smaller army, aided by the blockading squadron of that 
coast. But I very much doubt whether the government 
ought to risk the expedition, under any commander, with 
a land force less than 12, perhaps 15,000 men. To reach 
that point (city of Mexico), or to place it in imminent dan- 
ger of capture, an army of more than 20,000 men may be 
needed." 

On the 23d November, it having been determined to 
send General Scott to the field in chief command, he 
sketched a project of instructions, which in his judgment 



48 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

should be given to him by the President. The following 
is an extract : " The President, respecting your judgment, is 
pleased with the assurance that, although you think 15,000 
land troops not an unreasonable force for the expedition in 
question, and that 10,000 ought to be considered the mini- 
mum number, if it can be obtained in time, you are yet of 
opinion that the expedition ought to go forward, even with 
the first 8,000 men that may be embarked off Point Isabel, 
sooner than incur the danger of losing your men and ob- 
ject by the yellow fever, in consequence of waiting too 
long for either of the larger numbers that have been men- 
tioned." 

Gen. Scott writes to Gen. Taylor, Dec. 20th, 1846, from 
New Orleans : 

"I have supposed that 15,000 land troops, including 5 
of regulars, and the cooperation of the blockading squad- 
ron, desirable, if not altogether necessary, but am now 
inclined to move forward to the attack, should I be able to 
assemble the 5,000 regulars, and say three of volunteers." 

Again, he writes to Gen. Taylor from Camargo, January 
3d, 1847 : 

" I believe my arrangements of every sort to be com- 
plete, except that every thing depends on my drawing from 
your command about 5,000 regulars and thousand 

volunteers." 

To the Secretary of War, Gen. Scott writes on the 12th 
January, from the Brasos, that he hopes to arrive off Vera 
Cruz by February 10th or 15th, and adds : "I shall at- 
tempt the descent, &c., with even half the numbers I should 
wish to give to any one of my juniors for the same ser- 
vice." ******** 
" Should success crown our arms on the coast — and I will 
not anticipate a failure — I beg to repeat that a reinforcemen t 
of 10 or 12,000 regulars (new regiments and recruits for 
the old) will be indispensable (about April) to enable me to 
make a consecutive advance on the enemy's capital." 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 49 

Again from off Lobos, February 28th, 1847. '-Never- 
theless, this army is in heart, and crippled as I am in the 
means required and promised, I shall go forward, and expect 
to take Vera Cruz and its Castle in time to escape, by 
pursuing the enemy, the pestilence of the coast." 

Again from Jalapa, April 6th, 1847. Referring to the 
expected levies not arriving, Gen. Scott writes, "I shall 
nevertheless advance, but whether beyond Puebla, will de- 
pend on intervening information and reflection. The gene- 
ral panic given to the enemy at Cerro Gordo still remaining, 
I think it probable that we shall go to Mexico ; or if the 
enemy recover from that, we must renew the consternation 
by another blow." 

Again from Jalapa, May 20th, 1847. Referring to a 
second train expected from Vera Cruz. " If it has a second 
third of the essential supplies — now long waited for — I 
shall advance, having lost the hope of receiving further 
reinforcements." 

These extracts, taken in connection, show how firmly 
and how perseveringly he adhered to the plan of the cam- 
paign. The two most important facts leading to this 
conclusion, are his discharge of the volunteers and his 
movement to Puebla, sundering his connection with home. 

Major Ripley on these two points takes essentially the 
view of Gov. Marcy in his famous reply to Gen. Scott — that 
reply which elicited so much admiration at the time, for its 
great ability — but which a careful examination shows to 
have been, in some respects, " more ostentatious than pro- 
found ;" and of which one of the distinguishing charac- 
teristics is, that it very successfully exposes to the public 
gaze the infirmities of one of the country's most devoted and 
most meritorious sons. 

The Secretary of War had repeatedly communicated 
to Gen. Scott the instructions of the President, to be care- 
ful of the lives and of the health of the troops— to put 
4 



50 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

them in healthy positions during the sickly season — to run 
no risk in occupying unhealthy localities. In May, Gen. 
Scott learned that the new levies had been diverted to the 
Rio Grande. The unhealthy season was approaching. 
Nearly the whole distance from Vera Cruz to Jalapa was 
exposed to the malaria of the coast. Not doubting that the 
Secretary would, in his own sphere, conform to the spirit of 
his own instructions, Gen. Scott presumed that if rein- 
forcements came at all, they would come within the two or 
three following weeks, that were to be occupied by him at 
Jalapa, getting up indispensable supplies. At the end of 
that time, he had every reason to believe that the connection 
with Yera Cruz would be entirely cut off, and that the 
army would be left to itself till the close of the sickly sea- 
son in the fall. Thus the volunteers on the expiration of 
their term of service in six or seven weeks, would have 
found themselves in the heart of the enemy's country 
utterly unable to reach the coast, and to be transported to 
their homes. The Government was bound in good faith to 
discharge these men at the expiration of their term of ser- 
vice, and it became evident that this involved their dis- 
charge at the very time it occurred — the only time indeed 
when, according to the information possessed by the General 
of the health of the country, they could be sent home in 
safety. Who more needed their services than Gen. Scott? 
Who was more strongly interested to strain a point, to keep 
them to the standard of their country ! What' else could 
have influenced the General than a sense of what was due 
these men, ajid an earnest desire to carry out the instruc- 
tions of his Government ? When Gen. Scott reached 
Puebla, he found the sick list so enormously large, that to 
advance upon Mexico, it was deemed necessary to bring to 
his aid the garrison of Jalapa. His breaking up of that 
post, shows how much he was in earnest, and that through 
the most trying circumstances, he kept his eye fixed on the 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 51 

great object of the campaign. Referring again to the Sec- 
retary's repeated instructions in reference to the health of 
the troops, the General could not have dreamed that the 
Secretary would make troops run the gauntlet of disease 
and death from Vera Cruz to come to his aid. On the con- 
trary, he was obliged to presume that there would be no 
necessity of opening the communications till fall. And the 
garrison of Jalapa, not needed for this purpose, would be a 
great, and might be a decisive element in the success of the 
advance upon Mexico, and he felt obliged not to dispense 
with its aid. And yet the Secretary in his letter speaks 
in terms of ridicule and of reprehension of these two mea- 
sures — measures which were the natural consequence of 
his own instructions — and which all men would have pro- 
nounced eminently wise and fortunate, had the Secretary 
adhered to his own doctrines. When Secretary Marcy 
reprehended Gen. Scott for these measures, he in fact repre- 
hended Gen. Scott for not disobeying his own express in- 
structions. He in fact said, " I did tell you to be careful of 
the health of the troops — but this was all mere talk — and 
you should have paid no attention to it." Let the appeal 
be made from the Secretary's letter to the Secretary's in- 
structions. Can the Secretary exclaim, " Thou canst not 
say I did it?" 

When the President committed to General Scott the 
chief command of all the armies operating in Mexico, and 
sent him to the field with assurances that he had his en- 
tire confidence, he banished every feeling of resentment, 
and entered upon his duties in the spirit of entire subordi- 
nation to the wishes and instructions of the government. 
Under these circumstances, what other construction could 
he put upon the attempt to supplant him in command by 
the appointment of a lieutenant-general, than that he had 
lost the confidence of his government ? And must he not 
have been confirmed in this impression on seeing a gentle- 



52 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

man sent out in a diplomatic capacity, who was understood 
to be unfriendly to him, and whose instructions were so 
loosely framed, that, in connection with his subsequent 
assumption of high prerogative, General Scott was natu- 
rally led to the conclusion that it was the intention to de- 
prive him of a portion of his rights as commander of the 
army ? The President committed two inexcusable blun- 
ders, in the lieutenant-general scheme, and in sending out 
in a diplomatic capacity a gentleman unfriendly to General 
Scott. Fortunately, Congress did not sanction the first, and 
the sound sense and exceeding uprightness of character of 
Mr. Trist rectified the second. The reconciliation between 
General Scott and Mr. Trist is one of the brightest events 
in this whole campaign. It was the natural result of two 
strong, honest, direct minds laboring in singleness of pur- 
pose for a common object. We bear testimony to the man- 
liness and thorough disinterestedness of Mr. Trist's course 
in Mexico. His errors in the outset grew out of the atmos- 
phere of distrust at Washington, from which he had just 
emerged, but he soon, with the native energy of a strong 
and independent character, saw and rectified his mistake. 

While we thus feel bound to expose the blunders of the 
administration, and particularly the sophistry of certain 
portions of Mr. Marcy's celebrated reply to General Scott, 
we are free to admit that the latter erred greatly in the 
unmeasured character of his complaints. He erred in at- 
tributing to design, what was partly due to ignorance and 
partly to accident. We have already expressed our opinion 
of the wise and patriotic services in general of both Mr. 
Polk and Mr. Marcy. Both General Scott and General 
Taylor ought not to have overlooked the fact, that the 
government could have no other interest than their own 
success. Disaster to our armies in the field, would have 
been disastrous to the statesmen at the head of the govern- 
ment. 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 53 

Whilst, therefore, we contend that in view of the in- 
structions of his government, General Scott was bound to 
discharge the volunteers and break up the garrison of Ja- 
lapa, we believe that, disregarding these instructions and 
exacting of the volunteers the last hour of their terms of 
service, he had it in his power to push forward to the Mex- 
ican capital and to occupy it almost unresisted. We think 
that, with the immediate prospect of entering the halls of 
the Montezumas, many of the volunteers might have been 
induced to re-enlist. The rapid movement of our army 
must have prevented any rapid organization of the public 
force of Mexico. The movement would not have been 
dangerous in the first stage, but it would have been ex- 
tremely hazardous in the second, when the terms of service 
of the volunteers had expired and they were being sent to 
their homes. Had it been the avowed determination of the 
government entirely to disregard the season, and to push 
troops forward in spite of disease and death, there could 
have been no hesitation as to the propriety of the move- 
ment. But such was not the policy of the government, and 
the subsequent delay was the price of a regard to consid- 
erations of humanity. With these general observations, 
we will come at once to the siege of Vera Cruz. 

The landing at and reduction of Vera Cruz was effected 
in March. The most remarkable thing about the siege 
was the excessive labor of the troops owing to the preva- 
lence of continued and distressing northers, frequently 
destroying the works. The batteries were planted with 
great judgment, and at some eight or nine hundred yards 
from the city. Trenches connected the batteries with each 
other and with the lines in rear, insuring throughout the 
siege safe and easy communications to the troops. The 
main reliance was on the mortars. A portion of the troops 
were impatient of the delay, and were anxious to be sent 
to the assault, without waiting for the effect of the bom- 



54 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

bardment. The wisdom of the course pursued was soon 
vindicated, by a proposition of the Mexican commander to 
surrendt. on terms ; and on the 29th of March our flag was 
planted on the enemy's works. 

Meanwhile news had come of the crowning victory 
of Angostura, and that General Santa Anna had been sent 
back headlong upon San Luis Potosi, his army depressed, 
demoralized, and fearfully reduced in numbers. The sick- 
ly season was fast approaching. To gain healthy positions 
and to anticipate the enemy at the first mountain barrier, 
it was important to lose no time in sending forward the 
troops. As fast as means of transportation could be col- 
lected, they were put in motion — Twiggs's division in ad- 
vance. But with that remarkable celerity for which the 
Mexican armies were distinguished throughout the war, 
they were found in position at Cerro Gordo, and the battle 
of that name again vindicated American prowess. 

We do not propose to go into a particular examination 
of this celebrated action, certainly, both in its conception 
and execution, one of the most remarkable in the Mexican 
war. An attack was made in front by a brigade of volun- 
teers under the command of General Pillow. But the 
grand movement was by the flank, against the enemy's 
left and rear, thus cutting off his retreat and compelling 
him to lay down his arms. This involved the storming of 
the Cerro Gordo hill, the key point of his position. The 
ground had been reconnoitred by the engineers with ex- 
treme care. The movements were all known to be per- 
fectly practicable. Before the battle commenced, General 
Scott verified the dispositions and movements. Twiggs 
was in chief command of the advanced forces. To Harney 
was committed the main attack against the hill. To Riley 
a more advanced movement, flanking Harney's, and look- 
ing to the Jalapa road. To Shields a movement still 
more extended, bringing him to the Jalapa road well to the 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 55 

rear, and insuring, in conjunction with the other two move- 
ments, the success of the general plan. 

General Twiggs, early in advance, at a critical moment, 
ordered up a portion of Riley's command to relieve the 
pressure upon Harney of the enemy's flankers. In a won- 
derfully short space of time the Cerro Gordo was seized, 
and the Jalapa road occupied in force — Santa Anna with 
great difficulty making his escape on the wheel-mule of his 
carriage down an almost impracticable mule-path across 
the river. A portion of the enemy made good their escape, 
but those within the pass were compelled to lay down their 
arms. This too, notwithstanding the attack of Pillow had 
been repulsed, and the commander of the Mexican bat- 
teries attacked by him had insisted upon terms. 

Pillow was unfortunate in his point of attack. The 
enemy's strongest point, between batteries 1 and 2, was 
selected — instead of his weakest point, the right of battery 
1, along the river bank, as advised by his engineer officer, 
Lieutenant, now Brevet-Major Tower. And there was too 
much precipitation in pushing forward his assaulting col- 
umns before they were properly formed, and before his sup- 
porting columns were within distance. It had the effect, 
however, of distracting the attention of Santa Anna, who 
rode to that portion of the field in the belief that it was 
the main attack, nor was he disabused of this impression 
till it was too late to retrieve the field on the left. 

Major Ripley's description of the battle is good, with 
the exception that whilst he praises the deportment of com- 
mands and subordinates, he depreciates commanders. Gen- 
eral Twiggs is referred to in terms of disparagement, and 
with great injustice, and General Scott is spoken of as more 
of an indifferent spectator than an active participant. The 
order of battle is pronounced impracticable. He gives to it 
however an exposition which is at total variance with all 
the initial movements. It Avas indeed admirably drawn 



56 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

up, pointing out with great clearness the general movement, 
and leaving a proper discretion to commanders. 

We agree with Major Ripley that the anticipated num- 
ber of prisoners was not taken, but not in consequence, as 
he alleges, of the impracticable order of General Scott, but 
of another fact which he himself furnishes, viz. : — That 
General Canalizo, surnamed the " lion of Mexico," instead 
of bringing up his reserves to the attack, as ordered by- 
Santa Anna, took to precipitate and seasonable flight along 
the main Jalapa road. 

The battle of Cerro Gordo was followed by the occu- 
pation, in quick succession, of Jalapa and Perote. Mean- 
while, from the strategic position of Orazava, Santa Anna 
threatened our whole flank from Perote to Vera Cruz. The 
forward movement to Puebla drew him from that position 
to the defence of the capital. 

The advance to Mexico, steadily contemplated, and 
early expected, insensibly raised the minds of all men to a 
most admirable state of self-reliance unmixed with arro- 
gance or vainglory. From the commander to the private 
in the ranks, it was believed that a great work was to be 
done, and that, with steadfast hearts and strong arms, it 
could and would be done. 

During the pause at Puebla, General Scott gave especial 
directions to the engineers to collect information in refer- 
ence to the several routes to the capital, the obstacles of na- 
ture and of art which would obstruct our advance, the 
troops and the material which would be at the disposal of 
the enemy. Humboldt and other authorities were consult- 
ed, many intelligent persons who had passed over the sev- 
eral routes were examined, and in several instances spies 
were sent to make special examinations. 

From the information thus collected it was known that 
the city was entirely surrounded either by an inundation 
or by marshy ground, and was approached by eight cause- 
ways flanked with wet ditches, and provided with numer- 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 57 

ous cuts, — that the whole city was protected by a double, 
and in some places by a triple line of defensive works, well 
armed with cannon and defended by some thirty thousand 
men. The direct approach along the great national road 
was defended by the strong position of the Penon, seven 
miles from the city. Chapultepec stood boldly out on the 
southwest, and on the north there were known to be for- 
midable works in advance of Guadaloupe. 

After entering the valley along the national road, there 
were three general modes of approaching the city : the 
direct, along the national road ; around Lake Tezcuco 
on the north ; around Chalco and Jochimilco on the south. 

Early attention had been given to the Chalco route, and 
to the south and west, as the proper quarter whence to at- 
tack the city. The south presented an extended front, 
with four of the eight causeways of approach nearly par- 
allel to each other, and was necessarily weak. On the 
west the suburb of San Cosme, a single street lined with 
houses on either side, extended well into the country, and 
offered a vulnerable point. Chapultepec, not deemed a 
very formidable obstacle, required to be swept away, to be 
free to select the point of attack. Hence Tacubaya, a 
strong village overawing Chapultepec, became the key 
point of the whole operation. In the particular operation 
against the southern front, the occupancy of the church 
and village of Piedad was of the last importance, in view 
of all the southern gates, communicating directly with all 
the villages in rear from Tacubaya to San Augustin, and 
by a good cross-road, controlling the three causeways of 
San Antonio, Nino Perdido, and Piedad. 

These views occupied the mind of the General in Chief 
at Puebla, and they naturally grew out of the information 
collected by the engineers, and which was embodied in a 
map that, on reaching the valley, was found to be in the main 
correct, and sufficiently in detail to point out the strategic 
movements. A copy of this map was sent to each division 



58 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

commander. It shows a road round Chalco, connecting 
villages a few miles apart. There was no doubt as to its 
practicability for our troops and for light trains. But there 
was doubt as to whether large trains and heavy guns could 
be taken over it. The lake it was believed, could be used 
for this latter purpose. Gen. Scott, on leaving Puebla, though 
impressed with the great advantages of the Chalco route 
over all others, determined, however, before finally resolving 
upon his course, to march into the valley, and by reconnais- 
sance, verify the information that had been collected, and 
to collect all the supplementary information that entered 
into the determination of the question. 

Major Ripley states that about the time of leaving 
Pnebla, Gen. Scott was of opinion that the Chalco route 
was impracticable, and that his attention was fixed upon 
the more direct routes. That he was confirmed in his 
opinion by the result of his reconnaissances after entering 
the valley, and that in consequence, he fell upon the Mexi- 
calcingo project : and that he was finally induced to revert 
to the Chalco route in consequence of the advice of Gen. 
Worth, and the reconnaissance of Col. Duncan. Granting 
that this route was not practicable for trains, he censures the 
Mexicalcingo project as in violation of the rules of art and 
as fraught with danger to the safety of the army. 

We think that a fair and full view of the whole subject 
matter will show that Major Ripley has fallen into great 
mistakes, both as to his facts and his conclusions. The 
map itself furnished by Gen. Scott to all the division com- 
manders, would seem to be conclusive as to his information, 
as to the existence of a road round Chalco, and as to 
his attention not having been withdrawn from it. But 
other facts are no less conclusive. The very day of 
reaching Ayotla, a spy was sent to pass over the road 
to San Augustin, and the next morning the engineers 
were sent out with an escort from Twiggs's division to make 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 59 

an ostentatious reconnaissance before the Penon, with the 
special charge to run no risk, as the object was to amuse the 
enemy. The road, however, to Mexicalcingo, which at 
Puebla had been reported to be under water, was found to 
be hard and good for one or two miles, and the Peones in 
the vicinity were positive that it was equally good for the 
whole distance. This introduced a new element into the 
calculations, and Gen. Scott then began to consider whether 
Tacubaya could not be reached by this direct and more 
practicable road. Accordingly, he ordered a particular ex- 
amination of the Mexicalcingo route the next day. The 
escort of the engineers consisted of a squadron of dragoons 
and the rifle regiment. Two veteran regiments and a field 
battery, the whole under the command of Gen. Smith, 
blocked up the Penon, and covered the reconnaissance. 
This protection was ample. No Mexican force could have 
issued from a narrow causeway with this body in front. 

Major Ripley wastes a whole page and a half of criticism 
on the erroneous supposition that the Penon was left wholly 
unguarded, that the whole brigade of Smith had gone to 
Mexicalcingo, and that Santa Anna could have sallied 
forth and cut him off before succor could have been 
brought from the main army. 

The goodness of the road was confirmed, though Mexi- 
calcingo was found to be very strongly fortified. The spies, 
two of whom had been dispatched, reported the road round 
Chalco to be practicable but rough. Boats and material for 
rafts were collected to be used on the lakes. 

Gen. Scott the same day visited Worth at Chalco, and 
directed the latter to make additional inquiries as to the 
character of the road. Duncan suggested to Worth an open 
reconnaissance, and was by Worth ordered to conduct it. 

In his quarters, that evening, the Mexicalcingo project 
was discussed — which was, simply to block up the Penon 
with Pillow's division, and to force Mexicalcingo with the 



60 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

three remaining divisions — Twiggs and Quitman attacking 
in front, and Worth (moving rapidly round the lakes with lit- 
tle or no baggage) in flank and rear. A single division not 
only would keep the enemy, known to be collected in great 
force, guns and men, in position at the Peiion, but would 
prevent his issuing therefrom to fall upon our rear. The 
road to Mexicalcingo was beyond cannon range, so that our 
troops could not be annoyed in their march. Thus, whilst 
a very large proportion of the enemy would have been 
amused by a single division, the three remaining divisions 
would have been thrown on a single point. Mexicalcingo 
forced, we should have been beforehand with the enemy ; 
and concentrating our force, whilst his own troops and guns 
were in movement from the Penon, we could have pierced 
his extended line, and by one grand blow have ended the 
campaign. 

Mexicalcingo was strong. But the road round Chalco 
was long and difficult. The march must have been slow and 
toilsome. Delay and accidents might occur in transporting 
the baggage along the lakes. We should expect that the 
enemy, rapid in movement and in throwing up defensive 
works, would meet us on the south and west with the same 
troops and guns in position that we turned our backs upon 
at the Penon, and with works perhaps not less formidable. 

In view of all these considerations was the Mexicalcingo 
project entertained. But it was not deemed safe to send 
Worth's division round Chalco, unless a communication 
could be constanty kept up by boats with the bulk of the 
army operating on the direct route. 

The practicability of keeping up this communication was 
therefore to be determined ; which duty was assigned to 
Capt. Wayne, Quartermaster, and to Lieut. Tower, Engineer. 

In the morning, Gen. Scott, anticipating a favorable re- 
sult as regarded this examination, gave some initial orders 
looking to the Mexicalcingo route. But towards night, learn- 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 61 

ing from Capt. Wayne and Lieut. Tower that nothing what- 
ever could he done with the lakes, and from Col. Duncan 
that the road round the lakes was excellent, he reverted to 
his original intention of moving the whole army round 
Chalco. 

The utter impracticability of using the lakes as a means 
of communication, led of necessity to the abandonment of 
the attack on Mexicalcingo. A direct attack only was 
never for a moment contemplated, and it was impossible to 
concert a combined attack against the front and in flank and 
rear. 

The reconnaissance of Col. Duncan removed all doubts 
as to the entire practicability of the Chalco route for our 
immense trains and our heavy guns. This reconnaissance, 
under existing circumstances, was absolutely necessary. If 
it had not been made by Duncan on the 14th, it must have 
been made by some other officer on the 15th. Worth and 
Duncan are entitled to the credit of having from the first 
seen the importance of the route. They took the initiative 
in making an open examination of it, and thereby probably 
saved one day in the movement. But the promptitude and 
decision of Gen. Scott in resolving upon his course as soon 
as this supplementary information came in, is conclusive as 
to his grasp of the whole field, and, in connection with facts 
already recapitulated, is equally conclusive as to the Chalco 
route equally with the other routes having ever been kept 
in mind. 

The friends of Worth and Duncan expose the ser- 
vices of these officers to depreciation in claiming for them 
the whole credit of the movement round Chalco. They 
did a positive service in accelerating a movement, the suc- 
cess of which depended so much upon time. But we think a 
careful inquiry into the facts will show that the Chalco 
route would and must have been pursued, even though they 
both had opposed it. It was a fixed fact which had im- 



62 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

pressed itself upon many officers of that army. We say 
this in simple justice to all the participants in that move- 
ment, and with no intention to disparage Worth or Duncan. 
Their names have now become historical, and should be 
cherished by their companions in arms. 

To Worth we shall hereafter allude. Duncan, stricken 
down in the midst of a still opening manhood, was, in 
many respects, altogether the ablest of our younger officers. 
He showed throughout the war abilities of the highest 
order, and on both lines his services were conspicuous. On 
the battle-field, wonderfully quick, cool, and resolute — 
piercing with a glance through the plans of the enemy, 
and discovering the strong and weak points of the field ; 
and in council patient, deliberative, and full of forecast. 
His fame is dear to us, and it is not for us to pluck a single 
laurel from his brow. 

The march round Chalco was therefore resolved upon, 
and it was made. Worth, in advance, seized San Augustin 
on the 17th, the rear under Twiggs not getting up till the 
morning of the 19th. Gen. Scott, on reaching the advance 
on the morning of the 18th, summoned his engineer offi- 
cers, and observing, ' ; to-day the enemy may feel us, to- 
morrow we must feel him," ordered prompt and careful 
reconnaissances of the different routes to the capital. 

The San Antonio causeway led due north from San 
Augustin twelve miles to the city. A mule-path running 
nearly west led to the nearly parallel and equally good 
road of San Angel. The reconnoitring officers were 
divided, and proceeded in these two directions. 

With Worth's division as a support, and Thornton's 
dragoons as an escort, the engineers proceeded on the San 
Antonio causeway, and found the enemy in force in the 
strongly fortified position of San Antonio. Worth's divi- 
sion seized the Hacienda Capua in front of San Antonio, 
and the reconnaissance was pushed to the right and left. 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 63 

The right was found impracticable, and the left extremely 
difficult, in consequence of the Pedregal. The reconnais- 
sance towards the San Angel road verified the infor- 
mation collected in Puebla. that, by a little work, the 
mule-path leading thereto could be made practicable for 
wagons. A division of the enemy was, however, found in 
full force opposite the egress of this path. 

Two plans were discussed at the quarters of the General 
in Chief the same evening — one to force San Antonio, the 
other to mask San Antonio, and gain the San Angel road. 
The forcing of San Antonio would be done in near 
presence of the main Mexican army, and might lead to 
a general contest in his strongly fortified line of works. 
The gaining the San Angel road involved at the most 
encountering a single division of the enemy, at a distance 
from his main body, and could not but lead the army to 
the desired strategic position of Tacubaya with little loss. 
But the policy of the enemy being to fight behind his works, 
the office of this division was that of observation!, and it 
was to be expected that, as soon as our movement was 
developed, it would retire upon the main body. The 
forcing of San Antonio would certainly involve a sharp 
conflict, and might lead to a general action. The crossing 
to the San Angel road would not probably be seriously 
opposed by the enemy. If a fight did ensue, it would be 
outside his works, under the most advantageous circum- 
stances for us, and the most disadvantageous for him, and 
it was the very thing to be desired. 

The movement upon San Angel was decided upon, and 
Worth was kept in front of San Antonio to mask it. Quit- 
man's division was ordered to hold San Augustin, now 
become the key of operations. 

On the morning of the 19th, Pillow's division was sent 
forward to make the mule-path practicable for the trains, 
and Twiggs, on coming up from the rear, was ordered to 



64 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

the front to cover it and brush away the enemy. In case 
the action became general, Pillow was to assume the com- 
mand until the General in Chief came upon the field. 

Accordingly Pillow's division worked the road. Twiggs 
pushed his division past Pillow's, who placed at his dispo- 
sal his own batteries, and immediately began his part of 
brushing away the enemy. All the engineers and topo- 
graphical engineers of the general staif, save three, were 
at that time serving with Twiggs and actively engaged in 
reconnoitring. 

The result was, that Twiggs was advised to make the 
main attack against the enemy's left, to cut him off from 
his reinforcements from the city, and to hurl him into the 
gorges of the mountains. To cover this movement, he was 
advised to make a bold demonstration in front, and to 
employ Callender's howitzer battery in driving the enemy's 
skirmishers in great force from the Pedregal. The demon- 
stration, to be effective, must be sharp, fierce, bold, like a 
real attack, and Magruder's battery was pushed forward to 
give countenance to it. Accordingly, Twiggs dispatched 
Riley against the left and Smith to the front. 

The front attack was made with exceeding vigor and 
effect; it held firmly the attention of the enemy, and ena- 
bled Riley to seize the village of Ansaldo. 

But though Pillow gave independently to Riley the 
order which had been received from Twiggs, he allowed 
more than an hour to elapse before doing any thing to sup- 
port either the front or flank attack. This unfortunate de- 
lay gave time for the enemy's reinforcements to come up, 
and prevented carrying into effect on that day the original 
suggestions of the staff-officers of the General in Chief. 

Riley moved about half past one o'clock, Cadwallader 
not till nearly three. Riley moved to the rear of, and re- 
connoitred the enemy's camp, with two successful encoun- 
ters with the enemy's lancers. Cadwallader was obliged 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 65 

to halt at the village to keep the immense reinforcements of 
the enemy in check. 

Though Cadwalader moved too late to attack the rear 
of the enemy's camp in concert with Riley, he moved in 
time to prevent the junction of the enemy with the com- 
mand of Valencia. 

Simultaneously with the movement of Cadwalader 
two regiments of Pierce, at the request of Twiggs, were 
ordered to the front. They advanced with great spirit, and 
under the guidance of the engineer-officers seized the ra- 
vine within four hundred yards of the camp. 

The bold demonstration in front, and particularly the 
daring and prompt movement of Pierce, distracting the at- 
tention of the enemy, was Riley's safety in his isolated posi- 
tion encountering the lancers, it being remembered that 
Cadwalader was still struggling through the Pedregal. 

Morgan's regiment, which had been detached as a re- 
serve, was not sent to reinforce Cadwalader, though the 
reinforcements of the enemy were now seen coming from 
the city, till Cadwalader had been a whole hour in move- 
ment. 

About this time also, the demonstration in front having 
done its work. Smith moved also to the village. 

On reaching the village General Smith assumed com- 
mand, and resolved to attack the reserves of the enemy. 
But after making all his arrangements, he was obliged to 
abandon the attempt in consequence of the approach of 
night. 

General Scott came upon the ground about four o'clock, 
and on the arrival of Shields an hour and a half later, he 
immediately dispatched him to the same point. 

At nightfall therefore the enemy was intact in his in- 
trenched camp. The San Angel road was seized, and two 
strong villages occupied, cutting Valencia off from succor. 
Two regiments of Pierce, the batteries and a few rifles, 
5 



66 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

were in front. The troops had worked and suffered pro- 
digiously, and nothing apparently had been done. Cheer 
upon cheer came from the enemy's lines. The rain began 
to fall, and in their dreary bivouac, our brave troops looked 
forward with anxiety to the day. 

General Smith resolved to attack the intrenched camp 
at three in the morning. He sent Captain Lee to the Gen- 
eral in Chief to communicate his plans, and if they met his 
approbation, to arrange an attack in front. But with the 
true spirit of a soldier, he declared his determination to prose- 
cute his attack in case the difficulties of the way prevented 
his getting a response from the General in Chief. 

It was a memorable evening, that of the 19th of Au- 
gust, in the quarters of General Scott. Many officers of 
his general, as well as personal staff, were present. There 
was some despondency on the part of those who simply 
looked to the fact that after a day of incessant labor and 
great exposure, the enemy had not been seriously touched. 
But the confidence of all was restored by the great cool- 
ness and steadiness of the General in Chief. As his officers 
came in from the field, wet and hungry, he made them sit 
at his table and break their fast. He neglected none of the 
courtesies due to guests. His bearing was most noble. It 
exalted the spirits of all present. 

About eleven o'clook, Capt. Lee came in from beyond 
the Pedregal, stated the aspect of the field, and submitted 
the plan of General Smith. From other officers was ascer- 
tained the position of each regiment in front. At this junc- 
ture Generals Pillow and Twiggs came in. They had 
struggled for several hours in the Pedregal, after nightfall, 
in the endeavor to reach their commands, and had been 
obliged to abandon the attempt. 

General Scott made known to them the position of their 
respective commands and the whole state of the field. He 
expressed his entire approbation of the plan of General 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 67 

Smith, and his determination to support it by an attack or 
demonstration in front. Not a suggestion had either of 
these, the two division commanders of the force in that 
village of San Geionimo, to make, in reference to the con- 
templated plan of attack. 

About midnight Capt. Lee was ordered back to the 
field, with the orders of General Scott to collect and form a 
temporary brigade under Ransom, of the two regiments of 
Pillow's division on this side of the Pedregal, and some 
scattered troops of other commands, to support General 
Smith's attack. General Twiggs, though a heavy man, 
advanced in years, and much injured by a fall in the Pedre- 
gal, peremptorily declined General Scott's invitation to 
take lodgings in his quarters, and returned to the field. 
General Pillow was ordered to remain. 

Contreras is embalmed in history, and we need not re- 
peat the glorious story. The veteran division of Valencia 
was broken into pieces, and our army resumed its move- 
ment upon the capital. 

Thus pursuing the San Angel route to Tacubaya, the 
enemy, in his folly, had offered his flank to our blow, and 
now in return we were pressing on his centre, and on his 
rear. Every man in that glorious army saw before him a 
beaten and dispirited enemy, who must be pursued to his 
final overthrow. All eyes saw before them that splendid 
city, all hearts felt that the decisive moment had come. 
The toils of the morning, the sleepless bivouac, the inces- 
sant labors of the Pedregal were forgotten. Shields, Twiggs, 
Pillow, successively in command, pushed forward the 
troops on the heels of the retreating enemy. One terrific 
blow, and peace would be restored to that unequalled val- 
ley, and the high mission of that band of heroes would be 
accomplished. 

General Scott, at early dawn, had ordered a brigade of 
Worth to proceed in the direction of Contreras, to guard 



68 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

against the possibility of disaster, and proceeded himself to 
the field. As soon as information of the victory was re- 
ceived, the brigade was ordered back, and the General in 
Chief, on reaching the intrenched camp, at once resolved 
upon his plans. They were in perfect accordance with the 
state of affairs so entirely unexpected, on initiating the 
movement of the previous day. Not Tacubaya was to be 
reached, but the enemy himself was to be struck. 

General Scott sent word to General Worth that he 
should attack the rear of San Antonio with the victorious 
troops now pushing forward from the battle-field of Contre- 
ras. Worth was ordered to display his division in front of 
San Antonio — to be on the alert, and on hearing the report 
of arms to fall upon the enemy in front. 

In reply to a message from General Pillow suggesting 
the same movement, General Scott ordered him to move on 
cautiously ; and he soon after followed himself. He 
reached the army some fifteen minutes after it was halted 
by his orders at Coyacan, and was received with the most 
enthusiastic cheering. 

He immediately directed one engineer officer, with 
Kearney's troop of dragoons and the rifle regiment as an 
escort, to reconnoitre the rear of San Antonio, and another 
to observe the field from the steeple of the church. In 
some ten minutes the latter officer reported that the enemy 
were abandoning San Antonio, and that the road for a mile 
was occupied by his troops and baggage in retreat. 

Immediately General Twiggs was ordered, by a cross 
road running to the east, to fall upon the retreating enemy 
with Smith's brigade. Pillow, with a single brigade (Cad- 
walader's), was sent on a road to the southeast, to co- 
operate with the advance of Worth. The brigades of Riley, 
Pierce, and Shields, were held in reserve, to await the de- 
velopment of the field. 

Twiggs pushed forward Smith's brigade, and halted its 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 69 

head at a fork of the road. Two of the engineer officers, 
on duty with him, rode rapidly forward on these two roads, 
which were found to lead respectively to and in front of a 
strong stone building that was filled with the enemy's 
troops. At the junction of the north road with the San 
Antonio causeway, some 500 yards distant, the troops of 
the enemy were seen in full retreat. Without delay the 
engineer company was brought up to the front of the con- 
vent to push the reconnaissance. A prisoner was taken, 
who declared that the enemy had only two guns in position. 
The position itself was shrouded with trees and chapparel, 
so that only the upper portion of the works could be seen. 

Whilst Twiggs was interrogating the prisoner a firing 
was heard on the right. It was believed by some to be the 
rifles, and by others, the engineer company prosecuting 
its reconnaissance of the enemy's position. Immediately 
Twiggs determined to attack the convent and carry it 
by a "coup de main," thus succoring our own troops, 
supposed to be engaged in reconnaissance, and striking 
the retreating enemy on the San Antonio causeway. 
The position was believed to have been taken for the 
moment, to cover this very retreat. To enable the storm- 
ers to advance, he ordered Taylor's battery to be planted 
in front of the convent, to drive its defenders from the 
roof and windows by grape. 

Thus, in the vigorous pursuit of a defeated and retreat- 
ing enemy, was the advance brigade of the veteran divi- 
sion of Twiggs brought up against the key-point of the 
enemy's position ; and the terrible conflict of Churubusco 
was commenced. 

It must be remembered that Twiggs, at the head of his 
division at the fork of the roads, was only 400 yards from 
the walls of the convent, on the direct road, and 300 yards 
from the position afterwards occupied by Taylor's battery, 
and that he became hotly engaged with the enemy in thirty 



70 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

minutes from the first commencement of the reconnais- 
sance. 

The return fire of the enemy admonished both the 
division commander and the General in Chief of the true 
state of the field. Immediately the latter ordered Pierce to ad- 
vance with his brigade, by a road running nearly due north, 
and, making a detour, to fall upon the rear of the enemy ; 
and Shields soon after was sent in the same direction, with 
orders to assume command of the temporary division, and 
execute the orders orginally given to Pierce. Riley's bri- 
gade was sent to the support of Twiggs, and was by him 
ordered to attack the right and rear of the convent. 

But the firing which led to the prompt advance of 
Twiggs was really the shock of Worth's advance, a por- 
tion of the gallant 6th infantry, and a few men of the 5th 
(not more than 150 men), upon the Tete de Pont, a strong 
field-work covering the bridge of Churubusco on the San 
Antonio causeway, and a little retired behind the convent. 
Entirely unsupported, these brave men were obliged to seek 
cover, and await the coming up of the division. 

Worth's division was still well in rear. Before he 
received his orders from General Scott to co-operate in the 
attack in the rear of San Antonio, he had put Clarke's 
brigade in motion. Clarke pursuing the route reconnoitered 
on the two previous days, passed his command over the 
Pedregal to the right of the enemy. So difficult was the 
way, that only about one hundred men had emerged from 
the rocks, and approached the main road to the capital, as 
the enemy's retreating column, three thousand strong, was 
filing by. But under the advice and guidance of CapL 
Mason, of the engineers, this small body charged the 
enemy's column, and cut it in two. The brigade coming 
up, one-half of the enemy's force was so closely pursued 
by the 6th infantry, and one company of the 5th, that 
though the latter were unable to continue their advance, 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 71 

and were obliged to fall back from the terrible fire of the 
bridge head of Cherubusco, the former passed directly 
through and took no further part in the battle. The other 
half of the enemy's force was pushed back towards San 
Antonio, and across' the fields, by the bulk of Clarke's 
brigade, which, continuing its course, met Garland's bri- 
gade, put in motion one hour after the movement of Clarke, 
at no great distance in advance of the abandoned works. 

Clarke now countermarched, and, uniting his brigade 
with that of Garland, the division pushed forward on the 
causeway, and after gaining the position from which the gal- 
lant charge of Hoffman had been made more than an hour 
earlier, and whither he had withdrawn his command, was 
formed under the personal direction of Gen. Worth, and a 
portion against the front of the Tete de Pont, the remainder 
against its left flank, some along the causeway, and others 
in the corn-fields on the right, it was sent against the 
enemy's position. 

At this juncture, one sheet of flame proceeded from the 
enemy's extended line, and amid that terrific din of 
battle, bold assailants and bold defenders contested every 
foot of ground. Taylor's splendid battery nobly did its 
work, enabling Smith's stormers to gain a near position to 
the front of the convent. Riley had already opened his 
fire on its right. Worth's troops, now driven back, now 
gallantly advancing, finding certain death in one direction, 
and changing their course only to meet it in another, still 
with stout hearts, slowly gaining ground, inch by inch, sus- 
tained nobly the battle on the right. 

But the great strategic movement of the field was now 
well in progress, and the battle was near its termination. 
Shields, in command of his own and Pierce's brigade, had 
steadily pursued his way, and crossing the river of Churu- 
busco directed his command upon the San Antonio road. 
As he approached, the enemy detached from his main line, 



72 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

extending a new line of battle along the causeway, in the 
direction of the city. Shields moved more and more to the 
left, and the enemy extended his line in the same direction, 
more and more reducing his force in front. 

First, the regiments of Pierce, and then those of Shields, 
came under the fire of the enemy. It is not a subject of re- 
proach to these troops, all new, and those of Pierce just 
from home, that under the most dreadful fire of the battle 
they fell into confusion, and, gaining the shelter of some 
buildings, were with some difficulty re-formed. Their offi- 
cers made the most extraordinary exertions. Shields was 
conspicuous for his gallant bearing and his great personal 
exposure. The emergency required it. The only safety to 
his command, perhaps to the army itself, was to reach the 
causeway. Nobly did the gallant Palmettos sustain the 
honor of their State. Their colonel shot dead, their lieu- 
tenant-colonel wounded, four color-bearers successively 
shot down, and nearly one half their officers disabled, they, 
in conjunction with the New York regiment, were led on 
by Shields to the road, and the enemy's line was cut. 

About the same moment, the enemy's left flank, includ- 
ing the Tete de Pont, yielded to Worth's onset, and he in 
conjunction with Pillow, whose troops . (Cadwalader's 
brigade) had come up in season to be exposed to the fire, 
but not to take a decisive part in the operations, passed on 
towards the city. 

The convent, whose fire, half an hour previous to the 
success of Worth and Shields, had been nearly silenced, 
still held out. But attacked in front and right flank by 
Twiggs, all retreat cut off by Worth and Shields occupying 
the Tete de Pont and causeway in the rear, Duncan open- 
ing two guns on one of the long faces of the work, and 
Larkin Smith directing a 4-lb a gainst the convent, the white 
flag was hung out at the very moment that the 2d and 3d 
infantry carried the work at the point of the bayonet. 



KIO GKANDE AND OF MEXICO. 73 

Immediately the flag of the 3d infantry was planted on 
the roof of the building, and over one thousand prisoners, 
including three general officers, surrendered to Twiggs. 

Thus, by the prompt and masterly arrangements of the 
General in Chief, and the gallant conduct of commanders 
and of troops, was the terrible and decisive victory of Chu- 
rubusco achieved. It was won by a combined movement 
of all the divisions. All suffered in nearly equal proportion, 
and to no particular one belongs the glory. 

The gallant charge of Hoffman led to the prompt attack 
of Twiggs. It was the stern, steady attitude of Twiggs, 
and in particular the admirable serving of Taylor's battery, 
that paved the way for Worth's subsequent advance. 
Twiggs and Worth hotly engaged, it was the soldierly and 
admirable advance of Shields, that led to the weakening of 
the enemy's force in front. And it was Shields' final 
charge and Twiggs' unflinching attack, that led to the 
abandonment of the Tete de Pont to the vehement assault 
of Worth. The convent, the key of the position, was of 
course the last to hold out. 

Worth deserves great credit for his movements about 
San Antonio, not in consequence of its abandonment by 
the enemy, which resulted as a matter of course, from the 
advance of the main army to its rear, but for passing Clarke 
over the Pedregal, cutting the whole retreating force of the 
enemy in two, and preventing their taking any part in the 
subsequent battle. Worth was opposed to the Contreras 
movement as determined upon by Gen. Scott on the evening 
of the 18th, and was in favor of forcing San Antonio by the 
movements which he carried into effect on the 20th. Being 
advised by Gen. Scott of the movement of the main army, 
and knowing as a commander what its effect must be upon 
the garrison of San Antonio, he exercised a sound discretion 
in anticipating and modifying the order to attack in front 
when he heard a firing in rear. 



74 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

Shields especially commands our admiration, by his un- 
flinching resolution and gallant bearing in presence of the 
overwhelming force of the enemy. Although his troops 
faltered and broke, so terrible was the fire, and so great their 
loss, he succeeded in rallying and forming them, and glori- 
ously won that portion of the field. This gallant and mod- 
est officer, on reaching the village of Ansaldo, the evening 
before, after Smith had matured his plans to assault the 
heights, with a rare magnanimity declined all interference 
and direction, and contented himself with holding that key- 
point against the reserves of the enemy. But in the terrible 
agony of Churubusco, his was no secondary part, and we 
hesitate not to pronounce him second to no division com- 
mander on that field. 

We will now notice certain criticisms of Major Ripley in 
relation to general dispositions and movements. 

1. He censures the course of General Scott, in working 
the road before fighting the battle of Contreras. The battle 
should have been fought, and the road worked afterwards. 
To which we reply as follows : The enemy's force was 
known to consist of 30,000 men. There were 24,000 in his 
main lines, and only 6,000 in this camp. Their presence 
could have no other object than to observe our movements. 
Had we marched our two divisions against them, they would 
have retired, and the divisions would have marched back 
to work the road. 

If, however, contrary to their whole military system, the 
enemy had determined to make the grand struggle on that 
field, it was important that we should be able to bring to bear 
our whole disposable force, and have our artillery at com- 
mand. This involved working the road. General Scott 
foresaw and provided for both alternatives. 

Again, Maj. Ripley censures the dispositions of General 
Scott, on the ground that they contemplated the battle being 
commenced by one General, continued by a second, and ter- 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 75 

minated by a third. To which we reply, that the observa- 
tion will apply with equal force to many of the most cele- 
brated battles of Napoleon, particularly to Rivoli, where 
Napoleon did not come upon the ground till the battle was 
well commenced. And we presume, neither Maj. Ripley, 
nor any other well-informed military person, will contest 
the fact, that the maxims of Napoleon are to be illustrated 
by his campaigns. But the criticism of our author, though 
ingenious, is unsound. The orders of General Scott provid- 
ed for one direction. He placed at the head of the column 
his own staff-officers — men who knew his plans, and upon 
whose advice not only division commanders could rely, but 
were expected to rely with confidence. General Pillow 
was ordered to take command in case the action be- 
came general, that is, if the affair was any thing more 
than an affair of pickets, which we had all along the 
road during our marches in the valley, with the advise- 
ment, that the General himself vould promptly come on 
the field. We really cannot see what other course Gen. 
Scott could have pursued. If the criticism means any 
thing, it means this: that Gen. Scott should have been 
in the very advance, to direct the attack of our skir- 
mishers upon the enemy, or to resist their attack upon us ; 
that is, he should have been both in front of Twiggs at Con- 
treras, and in front of Worth at San Antonio. For how 
could Gen. Scott have foreseen that the 6,000 men of Valen- 
cia, arrayed on the height of Contreras, was not a feint, and 
that as soon as Twiggs and Pillow were well drawn out 
from San Augustin, the remaining 24,000 men of the enemy, 
would not have been hurled against Worth, and the main 
battle have been fought in defence of San Augustin, the key 
of all our operations ? Now, it is remarkable, that General 
Scott, in assigning to Quitman the command of this depot, 
enlarged upon this very consideration ; and it shows how 
comprehensive was his grasp of the whole field of opera- 



76 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

tions. It was necessary for the safety of the army, that 
Gen. Scott should remain in San Augustin till the enemy 
had shown his hand ; then was the time for him to repair 
to the field, which he did. 

Again, Major Ripley contends, that though Gen. Scott 
committed the military error of providing three successive 
commanders for that field, yet that by good fortune all the 
movements were under the supervision of one person, and 
he was Gen. Pillow. The facts are these : Twiggs' own 
division went into action by Twiggs' special order, and 
under his immediate supervision. Pillow placed his own 
batteries at Twiggs' disposal ; and with some general re- 
marks about opening the battle, refrained from all interfe- 
rence. The first dispositions were made by Twiggs, under 
the advisement of the staff officers of the General in Chief. 
The course to be pursued was manifest. The young lieu- 
tenants even saying to Twiggs before a battery had been 
pushed to the front : " The main attack should be against 
the enemy's left. Attack his left — you cut him off from his 
reserves, and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains." 
Pillow gave to Riley the same order which had previously 
been given by Twiggs, though without concert between 
them, and afterwards made a disposition of his own force 
similar to that of Twiggs. Pillow undoubtedly saw the 
necessity of the movements. He had the counsel of several 
highly intelligent staff officers, one being the author of the 
work under review. 

Inasmuch as he adopted General Twiggs' dispositions, 
conforming his own thereto, it may be said that the earlier 
movements of the day were made under his supervision, 
but not the subsequent movements. We will, however, 
respectfully ask, why was Pillow's course so vacillating and 
uncertain ? Why did he send an order to Riley, still strug- 
gling through the Pedregal, to return ? Why did he delay 
the march of Cadwalader and of Morgan ? Why did he 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 77 

send all three on an uncertain errand, without even indi- 
cating what they should do ? We answer, because he was 
wanting in the clear conception and prompt decision re- 
quired by the emergency, which is the gist of the whole 
matter. The known fact, that when the whole force was 
collected in that village no allusion was made to his orders, 
is very significant. 

In simple justice to Twiggs, he showed on that field, as 
well as on the field of Churubusco, great steadiness, resolu- 
tion, and intrepidity. We regret that Major Ripley has in- 
dulged in sneers at his conduct and soldiership. There are 
too many witnesses to his cool and gallant bearing to per- 
mit this to pass without rebuke. 

It has not been the fortune of courts of inquiry to be- 
come historical. Nor will a better fate await their com- 
mentators. The historian, in narrating the events of the 
second conquest of Mexico, will appeal to all the actors in 
that great drama. That entire army will be his witnesses, 
the world and latest posterity his judges. The court of 
inquiry upon which Major Ripley draws so largely, did not 
have before them the management of that army, but simply 
the part played by one of the subordinates. General Pillow 
was at its bar to exculpate himself from weighty charges, 
and yet the court, with but a fraction of the immense mass 
of testimony to guide their decisions, and under circum- 
stances making it their duty to give to the General the ben- 
efit of all doubts, came to the conclusion that he had arro- 
gated to himself too much credit for that field. Had 
Twiggs likewise been on his trial, and had all the officers 
serving with him been examined, the whole aspect of the 
case would have been changed. 

We consider the author's description of the battle of 
Churubusco as graphic and true. He fails in his observa- 
tions on the general movements. 

One of the most extraordinary views presented is this. 



78 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

That General Scott should not have fought the battle at 
all, but adhering essentially to his original plan, he first 
should have carefully reconnoitered the ground to the left 
of the position of Churubusco, and after bringing forward 
his trains from San Augustin, and establishing his depots, 
he should have advanced on the Ninon Perdido road and 
compelled the enemy to fight in the open field. This ob- 
servation is predicated on the fact that the Ninon Perdido 
road was totally unfortified when the battle of Churu- 
busco was fought. To which we reply: That a General 
who either by a blind adherence to an original purpose, or 
by too much care in selecting the most favorable point of 
attack, shall neglect to avail himself of the unforeseen chances 
of the contest, and particularly shall fail to strike his enemy 
when in full retreat and before he can have time to embody 
his troops, and especially when that enemy is demoralized 
by a disaster and his own troops are raised to the highest 
pitch of confidence and exaltation, is surely destined to be 
overthrown. This groping for a field of battle was the vice 
of that continental system, which led to Napoleon's extraor- 
dinary successes. General Scott would have criminally 
endangered the safety of his army and would have sadly 
depreciated his own reputation, had he hesitated for a mo- 
ment. 

What are the great facts of the battle of Churubusco ? 
They are these : General Scott launched his whole force 
against a point of the enemy's extended line, and with such 
vigor and resolution, that a very large proportion of the 
enemy's force never reached the field of battle. Our losses 
to be sure were great. But this was unavoidable in so un- 
equal a contest. Fortune favored us, and we had a chief 
who knew how to avail himself of her smiles. 

But we totally deny the alternative of our author. The 
establishing of our depots and the selecting of a new point 
of attack would have occupied the whole of the 20th, and 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 79 

probably a portion of the 21st. The enemy would have 
seen our hand, would have embodied all his force, and have 
completed his inner line of defensive works. Instead of 
righting in the open field where our field batteries could have 
been brought into play, we should have fought him behind 
his works in close proximity to the city, with his whole 
army embodied and confirmed in heart by the twenty- 
four to forty-eight hours' delay. 

There would have been no opportunity for a great strat- 
egic movement like that of Shields, essentially afield move- 
ment. We no doubt should have conquered ; but it would 
have been a prolonged struggle for many days, not one ter- 
rible onset of three hours, as really occurred. 

General Scott had but these two alternatives : to strike 
at once and with unflinching resolution, a retreating and 
demoralized enemy, at a distance from the city and essen- 
tially in the open field ; or to delay to strike and select a 
new point of attack, allowing the ardor of our troops to sub- 
side, insuring no increase of force, showing our hand to the 
enemy, giving him time to complete his interior line of de- 
fenses and to embody his whole force in firm array, to re- 
cover in fact from the discouragement of defeat. Who can 
doubt that General Scott showed the qualities of a great 
commander by his course ? 

But it is made a matter of accusation against General 
Scott, that he left his commanders without orders, and that 
the credit of the first general disposition of the troops belongs 
to fortune, and to no general officer whatever. To which 
we reply, that when General Scott gave his orders at Co- 
yacan, directing two brigades on two roads to strike the San 
Antonio causeway at two different points, the enemy were 
seen in full retreat on that causeway, towards the city. As 
soon as the fire of the enemy opened, developing better 
his position, the three remaining brigades were immediately 
pushed to the front and flank. This prompt movement 



80 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

against the enemy on the San Antonio road was in fact sub- 
stantially an order to General Worth, to press the enemy on 
that road. It was so understood, and must have been so 
understood by Worth. Pillow was sent to the rear of San 
Antonio. Why so? Was San Antonio his object, or the 
enemy, supposed to be near San Antonio ? The enemy ; 
and hence Pillow's change of direction. We are rather of 
opinion that had General Pillow pursued a fruitless errand 
towards San Antonio, and had General Worth failed to move 
upon the road, there would have been some emphatic orders 
from the General in Chief. 

The movements of Pillow and Worth, the change of di- 
rection of the former, and the embodying and pushing for- 
ward the division of the latter, after cutting the column of 
the enemy retreating from San Antonio, resulted as a mat- 
ter of course from the fact that we were now seeking the 
enemy and nothing else. A great fact of which the hum- 
blest soldier in that army was cognizant. Such move- 
ments belong to the responsibilities and discretion of divi- 
sion commanders, and in the present case, could not have 
been mistaken by the most ordinary capacity. 

General Scott throughout this campaign maintained his 
character of Commander in Chief, and never committed the 
folly of playing the part of a subordinate. 

We now quote, as having great significance in this con- 
nection, the following from Marshal Saxe. " Many com- 
manders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of war- 
fare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and 
two rival armies have been drawn out for action, their 
whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignment, 
an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of col- 
umns. They have considered it sufficient to give answers 
to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to send orders 
in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one 
quarter to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctu- 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 81 

ations of the day, or calmly watching for an opportunity to 
strike a decisive blow. They endeavor, in fact, to do every 
thing, and thereby do nothing." 

We respectfully inquire what orders did Gen. Scott for. 
bear to give, which ought to have been given? What or- 
ders did he give, which ought to have been forborne ? Mil- 
itary critics will find these questions hard to answer. 

The difficulty with Major Ripley's military criticisms 
is, that he does not discriminate between the sphere of 
the General in Chief and the spheres of division comman- 
ders Whilst Gen. Scott was responsible for the general 
direction of the divisions, the particular management of the 
divisions, the particular mode in which the advance of these 
divisions became engaged with the enemy, were matters of 
detail for which division commanders were responsible. 

Worth on the San Antonio causeway, Pillow in support, 
Twiggs on the cross-road, Shields to the rear — all had for 
their object the enemy — the enemy were to be attacked— a 
battle was to be fought — the war was to be ended. So 
much for Gen. Scott. In the execution of these move- 
ments each became engaged in a particular way, and the 
merit or the censure must inure to each accordingly. 

Objection is made that the country was not known ; to 
which we reply, that it was known sufficiently for the pur- 
pose of engaging the battle. The battle had to be entered 
into to get further knowledge. The prompt attack of 
Twiggs developed the whole front of the enemy, and ena- 
bled the General in Chief to make those final dispositions 
which achieved the victory. 

We do not mean to say that a vastly better hypothetical 
order of battle could not have been devised. But such a 
mode of treating the subject we consider puerile.* The 
question is simply this, with all the facts which the General 
in Chief had in his possession, it being admitted that much 
was unknown, was he justified in fighting the battle, and 
6 



82 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

would these facts have enabled him to make a better dis- 
tribution of his forces 1 

War itself is an operation where at all times much is ne- 
cessarily unknown. The great quality of a commander is> 
seizing essential crowning.facts, so to arrange his plans, as 
not to be disturbed by that terra incognita, which no mili- 
tary prescience can unveil. 

We unhesitatingly refer to the battle of Churubusco as 
affording incontestable proof of the great energy and ca- 
pacity of Gen. Scott on the field of battle. 

The consequence of this decisive conflict, demoralizing 
and fearfully reducing the public force of Mexico, was that 
an armistice was entered into for the purpose of negotiating 
a treaty of peace. At the moment of concluding this ar- 
mistice, Gen. Scott had in his possession ample proofs of 
the small military force which the enemy had at his dispo- 
sal, and few persons doubted that a treaty of peace would be 
finally concluded upon. In consequence of this conviction? 
shared by the General in Chief and the body of the army, the 
former determined to impose no condition which would in 
any respect throw obstacles in the way of negotiation, or 
unnecessarily humble Mexican pride. And in this spirit he 
receded from his first demand, that Chapultepec should be 
surrendered. 

This armistice is the subject of severe animadversion on 
the part of our author, and Gen. Scott is held up as endan- 
gering the safety and sacrificing the lives of his gallant 
troops, for the selfish object of winning popular favor and 
reaching the grand object of his life — the Presidency. 

We deem this a most unjust and illiberal view of the 
whole transaction. It requires but a very cursory examina- 
tion of the page of history to learn, that almost all the 
treaties of peace, resulting from the issue of arms, have 
first been preceded by an armistice, and this armistice has 
not unfrequently been proposed by the victorious party. 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 83 

An armistice, is at least a most desirable preliminary to a 
treaty of peace, though not absolutely essential. And yet, 
our author contends, that the Government, in sending out 
Mr. Trist, never intended there should be a suspension of 
hostilities until a treaty was actually signed. It will not be 
denied, that our government and people were exceedingly 
anxious to bring difficulties to a close. Every one was look- 
ing to the campaign of Scott to conquer a peace. This 
expression was in every body's mouth. Peace was the 
great object desired by all, and more grateful to all than 
the most splendid achievements of arms. Is not this fact 
the simple, obvious explication of Gen. Scott's whole course ? 
Was it not his plain and obvious duty, to let no opportunity 
slip that should promise to secure the accomplishment of 
this object 1 Personally, had he not more to gain by his 
triumphal entry into the magnificent city of the Astecs 
than by forbearing to enter for the sake of a peace, the nego- 
tiating of which was to redound to the honor of another? 

The course pursued by General Scott in entering into 
the Tacubaya armistice, will form one of the brightest 
pages of the history of our country. Through all time it 
can be referred to, as convincing proof of the moderation, of 
the sincerity, and of the magnanimity of the government he 
represented. And when we consider the fact, that Commis- 
sioners on both sides did meet, and that the negotiations at 
one time, were all but successful ; that Santa Anna himself 
had almost determined to sign the treaty, and that he deli- 
berated long before he concluded to make a second appeal 
to arms, we consider General Scott to be entirely vindicated 
in his course. 

We speak thus in general terms of the armistice. In 
reference to details, we think a mistake was made in not 
insisting upon the surrender of Chapultepec. But we do 
not consider this serious cause of censure, when we reflect, 
how utterly prostrate in the dust was the enemy, and how 



84 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

strong in himself and his galfcmt troops, was the victorious 
General. Major Ripley sneers at this magnanimity of Gen. 
Scott : we, however, thank God for its exhibition, and we 
have only to hope, that in our future wars, our armies shall 
have the guidance of a chief of equal skill and valor in the 
shock of battle, and of equal magnanimity to a conquered 
foe. 

The armistice proved of no avail. The conflict was re- 
newed, and in nine short days, Santa Anna and his army 
were driven fugitives from that valley, which all the wiles 
of policy, and all the resources of the state could not save 
from the iron grasp of his terrible antagonist. 

The armistice was brought to an end at twelve o'clock 
M., September 7th. During the morning of that day, the 
Mexican troops were seen marching out from the city, and 
taking a position in the vicinity of Molino del Rey. Gene- 
ral Scott had received information that the enemy had a 
boring apparatus at this place, and were at the time actively 
engaged in casting cannon. He determined to seize the 
foundry by a night attack, and to cut off this source of sup- 
ply. Gen. Worth was intrusted with the management of 
the enterprise, and Cadwalader's brigade reinforced his 
own command. The attack, made at dawn of day, was 
the most dreadful shock of arms of the whole war, and was 
finally won at all points by our gallant troops, after expe- 
riencing a greater proportionate loss than that of the English 
at the assault of Badajoz. The foundry was found, how- 
ever, to have no apparatus for boring cannon, and our troops 
were withdrawn from the position. 

We cannot but highly praise Maj. Ripley's description of 
this brilliant achievement, and we agree with most that he 
has to say in commendation of the skill of commanders, 
and the devotion of officers and of men. The surprise is? 
that after such a loss, and against such odds, the field was 
won at all ; and it exemplifies the hardihood, the patriot- 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 85 

ism, and the self-sacrifice of American troops. We more- 
over find his criticisms more just and discriminating, than 
many that have before come under our notice, and we con- 
cur with much that he has to say in animadversion of the 
measures of the General in Chief. We think with him, that 
Gen. Scott committed a mistake in directing a partial attack, 
for the mere purpose of destroying a foundry. We think 
the object was not of sufficient consequence, to have enter- 
ed for a moment into his plans. The battle of Molino 
should have been fought on the morning of the 8th of Sep- 
tember, not by three brigades simply, but by six brigades 
under the command of the General in Chief. Chapultepec, 
the pride, and the hope of the enemy, should have been 
seized. When on the morning of the seventh, Gen. Scott 
saw the enemy place himself without his city, and in strik- 
ing distance of his force, he should have hailed it as a fa- 
vor of fortune, and should have profited by it in the same 
masterly manner, as he did by the folly of Valencia, in stu- 
pidly maintaining his position in his intrenched' camp at 
Contreras. On the 6th, when he gave notice to Santa Anna, 
that the armistice would be terminated at 12 M. on the 7th, 
he should at the same moment have ordered Twiggs and 
Quitman, at San Angel and San Augustin, to be ready 
*o move to new positions on its expiration. When on the 
morniug of the next day, the movement of the enemy was 
developed, these Generals should have been ordered to con- 
centrate their troops at Mixcoac, and Pillow should have 
been advanced to Piedad. 

This disposition rendering it uncertain whether Scott 
would attack Molino, or the southern front, would doubtless 
have led to some detachments from the Mexican force to 
guard other avenues, and thus bringing up the divisions of 
Twiggs and Quitman at early dawn, the bulk of our army 
could have been directed with resistless force, and Chapul- 
£epee must have fallen almost without resistance. We hesi- 



86 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

tate not to say that in one short hour the battle would have 
been fought and won. It was the most splendid opportu- 
nity of the war. Not one division, but the bulk of Santa 
Anna's army had offered itself to our blow. 

It is said that General Scott did not contemplate a 
battle. To which we reply : it w*as utterly impossible to 
seize the foundry, without driving the enemy from his en- 
tire position — in other words, without fighting the battle. 
Let the friends of General Scott frankly admit that he 
committed a mistake. The vindication of General Scott at 
Molino is to be found in his splendid conduct at Chapul te- 
pee. Thus was it with Napoleon at Marengo. Thus, alas ? 
was it not with Napoleon at Ligny, and at Waterloo. 

But General Worth's dispositions were faulty ; the at- 
tack should either have been made at night, as originally 
intended by General Scott, or if deferred until dawn of.day, 
his dispositions should have been materially modified* 
With a fine veteran division we think a night attack would 
have succeeded. Suchet's Peninsular Campaigns are full 
of examples of the success of night attacks against disparity 
of numbers. The French troops were not superior to the 
veterans of Worth's division, and the Mexican troops were 
of the same character with those of Spain. Suchet always 
succeeded in his night attacks. 

In consideration, however, of the somewhat intricate 
nature and our limited knowledge of the position, we think 
it was safer to make the attack by daylight. Worth, there- 
fore, we think, ought not to be censured for deferring the at- 
tack until dawn of day, but for adhering to dispositions 
which were proper only for a night attack. He should have 
kept back his troops altogether, till the enemy were shaken 
by the fire of his artillery, and then have sent them to the 
assault. Not simply a select party of five hundred men, 
but that party followed closely by a veteran brigade, and a 
light battery, should have pierced the centre of his line. 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 87 

Then turning to the left, this body in conjunction with an- 
other brigade, should have swept the Casa-Matar, the artil- 
lery supported by the third brigade all the while playing on 
the foundry. The cavalry would have maintained our left 
flank and rear against the enemy's lancers. The Casa- 
Matar in our hands, against the attack of three brigades, 
and the whole of his artillery, the foundry could not long 
have held out. With such dispositions, and with a proper 
use of his artillery, we think General Worth could have 
carried the entire position with one third of the loss he ac- 
tually experienced. 

It was certainly a great mistake to push on that isolated 
column of five hundred men against the enemy's immense 
force, all the other troops remaining behind in position. 
Before succor was brought to this little band, four- fifths of 
their number were killed or wounded. It was a most ter- 
rible and unnecessary sacrifice of life. 

We consider these grave faults in- the preliminary dis- 
positions. The order of battle was of the parallel order, 
and in the very case where the parallel order should have 
been avoided. After the storming party was cut up, and 
driven back, the whole line with strong defensive works 
was attacked at once by the bayonet. The artillery was 
not used until the first assaults had failed and until the 
heavy losses had been experienced. But the battle having 
been, engaged, General Worth deserves great credit for his 
gallantry and resolution in maintaining the field,and for 
skilful dispositions in the heat of the contest. The final 
skill exhibited and success achieved more than redeemed 
the commencement, and justly entitle him to the favorable 
judgment of his countrymen. It is simple justice to Worth 
to state that he advised a general action and the storming of 
Chapultepec, and that from the first he was of opinion that 
destroying the foundry would be a more serious operation 
than was contemplated by General Scott. It was in conse- 



88 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

quence of this belief, and at his suggestion, that he was re- 
inforced by Cadwalader's brigade. 

We regret that our author, in animadverting with great 
freedom and severity upon General Scott's part in the battle 
of Molino, should find all of Worth's conduct entitled to eu- 
logium — and that obvious departures from the principles of 
war should have been entirely overlooked. 

We will pass on rapidly to the operations about Chapul- 
tepec, commencing with the council of war at Piedad, on 
the 11th of September. We shall give these operations the 
more careful attention, as Major Ripley has most laboriously 
endeavored to make them subserve the elevation of the mili- 
tary reputation of certain subordinate commanders, at the 
expense of the well-earned fame of the General in Chief. 

After the battle of Molino, Worth's division was posted 
at Tacubaya, and the remainder of the army was cantoned 
in the villages along the southern front, with a strong 
advanced post at Piedad. 

Whilst the sick and wounded were being transferred to 
Mixcoac, now become the general depot, the enemy's lines 
on the southern front were reconnoitred by the engineers, 
and on the 11th General Scott convened a council of offi- 
cers at Piedad, and submitted his views in reference to the 
plan of attack against the city. 

On this day, as on the two previous days, the enemy 
were rapidly strengthening their works on the southern 
front, and had already eleven guns in position. 

There were two projects of attack proposed by General 
Scott and submitted to the council — one was to attack the 
southern front, the other to attack Chapultepec. 

The attack against the southern front, and in close 
proximity to the city, almost unavoidably involved a pro- 
longed and murderous contest in the streets of the city, and 
with the small force at the disposal of the American Gen- 
eral, there was danger that, exasperated and inflamed by 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 89 

the remembrance of the sad scenes of Molino, onr troops 
would abandon themselves to pillage, and thus be liable to 
be cut off in detail. 

The attack against Chapultepec, standing boldly out 
full two miles from the city, would assimilate the contest 
more to one of the field, and might of itself induce the sur- 
render of the city. It was not to be expected that the force 
of the enemy, well broken in defence of Chapultepec, could 
be rallied very effectually in defence of the city. The 
taking of Chapultepec, moreover, opened the way to an ad- 
vance on the San Cosme suburb, referred to in a former part 
of this article as the strategic point of attack. Thus the 
storming of Chapultepec, besides striking a severe blow 
upon the enemy at a distance from the city, and snatching 
from him that place of strength upon which he relied for its 
defence, opened the way at once to the most vulnerable point. 

Most of the officers at the council of Piedad, instead of 
taking this large view of the two projects of attack, simply 
considered the relative facility with which the southern line 
of works, and those about Chapultepec, could be forced. 
Nor did they much weigh the fact that the enemy were evi- 
dently expecting us on the southern front, and that in storm- 
ing Chapultepec, we might reasonably expect, in prosecuting 
subsequent operations, to find them unprepared in the Cosme 
suburb. No one doubted the success of the American 
arms,- whichever project was adopted. But there was a 
general disposition to exaggerate the strength of Chapulte- 
pec. Now, a work on an eminence, with trees and inequali- 
ties of ground to its very walls, as was the case with Cha- 
pultepec, is the most easy to carry by storm, and the loss 
to be apprehended is but slight compared to an attack on 
level and open ground, as on the southern front. 

It was pretty evident that General Scott, on assembling 
the council, had determined to attack Chapultepec, both 
from the tenor of his opening remarks, and from his having 



90 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

previously directed sites to be selected for establishing coun- 
ter batteries, and accordingly the attack was resolved upon, 
although a majority of his officers inclined to the attack 
against the southern front. 

Thus far no allusion has been made to a demonstration 
against the southern front in connection with the attack 
against Chapultepec, for the simple reason that a demon- 
stration against Chapultepec, supported by counter batteries, 
must have necessarily entered into the plan of an attack 
against the southern front. A demonstration would have 
been effective in both attacks, and was not, therefore, a de- 
termining circumstance in either. 

Our author, taking the same restricted view as did a 
majority of the officers at the council of Piedad, is of opinion 
that the southern front of the city was the true point of at- 
tack, and, that the southern lines forced, the city would 
have been in our hands, and the citadel — a strong bastioned 
work in the southwestern quarter of the city — and Chapul- 
tepec, would have fallen by their own weight. 

The southern lines forced, as we advanced into the city, 
we should have been obliged to detach largely to guard our 
depots, and to maintain a firm attitude in front of Chapul- 
tepec, occupied in force by the enemy ; whereas, Chapulte- 
pec forced, a small garrison would have held it, and in the 
progress against the city, the diverting force at Piedad could 
have been drawn to the main body. 

Thus the southern attack in its subsequent prosecution 
involved large detachments from the attacking force. The 
attack against Chapultepec involved an increase of the at- 
tacking force, by an incorporation of the diverting force 
with the main body. 

For all these reasons the conclusion of the General in 
Chief was most fortunate. 

When the council of war broke up, although the Gene- 
ral in Chief was almost alone in favor of operating against 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 91 

Chapultepec, the utmost ardor and confidence was infused 
among the officers who were present, and soon, throughout 
the army. 

The spirit of the army, at first somewhat depressed by 
the losses of Molino, had been gradually rising, and it now 
reached its highest point of exaltation. Not for a single 
moment had the General in Chief been otherwise than vigi- 
lant, cool and self-sustained, never doubting our ultimate 
triumph, and not for' a single moment had either his officers 
or his men a doubt as to his safely leading them through 
the perils that encompassed them. 

The plan of attack against Chapultepec, was to counter- 
batter with heavy metal, until an impression was made on 
the defences and the morale of the garrison was well shaken, 
and then to carry it by storm. It was to be supported by 
a bold demonstration against the southern front on the part 
of Twiggs (Riley's brigade), at Piedad. 

Accordingly, the remainder of the army (excepting 
Smith's brigade), on the evening of the llth, was concen- 
trated at Tacubaya, and all the batteries but one were got 
in readiness during the night, and opened their fire in the 
morning. The battery referred to did not open its fire till 
towards night, in consequence of delays in furnishing work- 
ing parties ; and not, as stated by Major Ripley, in conse- 
quence of the severity of the fire rendering it impracticable 
to work. 

The necessary scaling-ladders were collected early in the 
day, and the plan of attack was definitely settled. There 
were to be two main columns of attack, consisting of the 
respective commands of Generals Pillow and Quitman, each 
furnished with a storming party of two hundred and fifty 
men, from the veteran divisions of Worth and Twiggs. 

Chapultepec, in reference to the entire line of the enemy 
in view of the American army, was but a point. Nearly 
one half the Mexican army could be kept in the lints in 



92 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

immediate proximity to the city, by a single brigade. This 
left disposable for the attack of Chapultepec seven-eighths 
of the American army. The ground was more unfavorable 
for the development of troops in the defence than in the at- 
tack. The attack pushed with vigor and resolution, the 
enemy would have found it difficult to bring to its defence 
one half his force, and still more difficult to apply it. 

Towards night, Gen. Scott summoned Generals Pillow 
and Quitman to his quarters, to arrange the plan of attack. 

The plan consisted essentially in moving down on the 
two sides of Chapultepec, and seizing the point of junction 
of the two roads of communication with the city, thus com- 
pletely isolating this important position ; and then, in con- 
junction with a movement of one of Pillow's brigades from 
the Molino, through the Cypress Grove, to storm the work 
itself. 

Pillow made many objections to this plan, and express- 
ed great fears as to his division being able to do the work 
that was assigned to it. He particularly objected to the 
division of his command, and was of opinion, that a single 
brigade was not sufficient to storm Chapultepec from the 
direction of the Cypress Grove. Gen. Scott showed that 
this was the weak point of the position ; that the difficulties 
of the advance were very much magnified, and that in con- 
junction with the other movements,, a single brigade only 
was necessary. Finally, Gen. Pillow, after yielding objec- 
tion after objection, stated his willingness to make the 
attack if his whole division was given to him, to which Gen- 
Scott assented. 

The plan of attack was therefore so modified, that Gen. 
Pillow's whole division was to be sent to the storming of 
Chapultepec, from the Molino and through the Cypress 
Grove, and Gen. Quitman's command was to move down 
on the Tacubaya road, and seize the batteries at its base. 

4-t early dawn, all the batteries opened a vigorous fire 



EIO GEANDE AND OF MEXICO. 93 

upon the enemy. Smith's brigade was withdrawn from 
Piedad to reinforce Quitman ; and Worth's entire division 
was advanced to the Molino, to be held in readiness for con- 
tingencies. Pillow was authorized to call upon Worth for 
reinforcements. 

At about 8 o'clock, the batteries ceased their fire by order 
of the General in Chief, and the two commands advanced 
to the assault. 

Our troops showed great ardor, and eagerly pushed for- 
ward on both lines. Pillow and Quitman were both at the 
heads of their commands. The resistance of the enemy 
was obstinate. But after a fierce contest of one hour's con- 
tinuance, Chapultepec was seized, and the enemy were 
driven from the entire position, with a heavy loss in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners. Quitman on the direct Tacubaya 
causeway, and Worth on the causeway leading to the wes- 
tern suburb of San Cosme, followed in pursuit ; Pillow, early 
wounded in the assault on Chapultepec, having been disa- 
bled for the rest of the day. 

After a protracted contest, in which Quitman exhibited 
remarkable energy, force, and gallantry, he seized at half- 
past one, the gate of Belen ; but directly in front of the cita- 
del exposed to a tremendous fire of the enemy, he was un- 
able to continue his advance, and was obliged to take shel- 
ter till nightfall. Worth — pausing in his advance to the 
Cosme suburb, in order to lend a hand to Quitman, hotly 
pressed on the Tacubaya causeway — finally advanced and 
seized the field-work at the junction of the road from Cha- 
pultepec and the Cosme causeway, and the western end of 
the suburb itself, at about half past twelve, and awaited the 
coming up of the engineer and ordnance trains, to prose- 
cute his further advance into the city. Resorting in part to 
the pick, and in part to artillery and the bayonet, at night- 
fall he was well advanced into the city, a majority of his 
command lodging within the Garita. During the night, 



94: CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

both Quitman and Worth made preparations to renew the 
attack in the morning, and Worth threw some shells into 
the centre of the city. 

Santa Anna withdrew his troops during the night, and 
took up a position at Guadaloupe, some two or three miles 
distant. 

The next morning the main plaza, and the national pa- 
lace were occupied early by Quitman's command, Worth 
having received orders to advance no farther than the Ala- 
meda ; and the General in Chief declining in the night to 
listen to the proposition of the City Council, to surrender on 
terms, announced in an order his occupancy of the Mexican 
capital. 

Still a desultory contest was kept up throughout the 
day from the houses of the city, by an intermingled body 
of soldiers and leperos led on by officers of the army, and 
was only stopped by the vigorous measures of the General 
in Chief, who ordered every house to be blown up from 
which a hostile shot should be fired, and every Mexican 
with arms in his hands to be put to death. 

Santa Anna, finding his plan of inciting our troops to 
pillage, by the natural exasperation of the street contest thus 
referred to, had signally failed, and that there was no chance 
of his being able to sin-prise them when abandoned to 
drunkenness and disorder, after waiting two or three days at 
Guadaloupe, divided his command. With a portion he re- 
paired to Puebla to try his fortune against Childs, the gov- 
ernor of that place, and to watch his opportunity to fall upon 
our reinforcements coming up from Vera Cruz. The re- 
mainder — a disorderly mob — repaired to Queretero, where 
the government was to be temporarily established. 

Both the city and valley of Mexico were now in undis- 
puted possession of our troops. 

We will refer the reader for a more minute description 
of the splendid operations of the day of Chapultepec, to 



EIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 95 

Ripley's narrative ; it is correct in its details, and is in the 
main to be relied on. 

We regret to be obliged to disapprove the whole spirit of 
his criticisms of these operations. Had it been his professed 
object to depreciate as much as possible the services of Gen- 
eral Scott, he could not have said less in his behalf. Had 
it been his professed object to give the most favorable view 
of the conduct and services of Generals Worth and Pillow, 
he could not have said more. 

But to the criticisms themselves : 

1. Pillow's disposition of his troops for the assault and 
his management in prosecuting it, are spoken of in terms of 
the most unqualified praise. 

Let us examine these dispositions a little in detail. 

Pillow objected to a separation of his division — the send- 
ing of one brigade to the rear of Chapultepec in conjunction 
with Q,uitman to cut it off entirely from the city and to 
prevent the throwing in of reinforcements — and the sending 
of the other to the direct assault through the Cypress Grove, 
and was allowed, at his urgent solicitation, to apply his 
whole command to the accomplishment of this latter pur- 
pose. Yet, what disposition does he make '? We use the 
words of the author : " The battalions of the eleventh and 
fourteenth regiments, and the two pieces of Magruder's bat- 
tery, all under Colonel Trousdale, were posted at the north- 
western angle of Molino del Rey for the double purpose of 
watching Alvarez, and the position of Pena-y-Barragan on 
the northern road of the Aqueduct. Except under a contin- 
gency, this corps were to be held in position until the castle 
fell, but in case reinforcements were seen to be entering the 
castle it was to engage them at all hazards." 

In other words, Pillow, though supported by the whole 
of Worth's division, instead of applying the whole of his 
division to the work of storming Chapultepec, actually 
placed nearly the whole of one of his brigades in observa- 



96 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

tion, with orders, however, to engage the enemy in case he 
was seen to be entering the castle. Scott's plan was prompt- 
ly to advance the brigade, to prevent all possibility of throw- 
ing in reinforcements. 

In the progress of the attack. Pillow, deeming a reinforce- 
ment necessary, instead of calling to his aid those regiments 
left in observation, called for one of Worth's brigades. 
Thus, though he objected to the division of his own com- 
mand, he had no objection to dividing Worth's. 

But we in substance quote still farther : 

" Tronsdale, believing he saw reinforcements enter the 
castle, advanced two pieces of Magruder's battery and the 
fourteenth infantry to support it. Worth arrived at the 
angle whilst the fire upon Jackson's section and the four- 
teenth infantry was continued and heavy. He ordered 
Captain Magruder to withdraw the pieces, and threw a por- 
tion of Garland's brigade to the left of the road, to take the 
barricades in flank. These troops came in as the enemy 
retreated, and the point was carried. This having been 
accomplished, the ditch was filled up, and the artillery and 
troops of the command were advanced along the designated 
route, in pursuit." Now, whilst Pillow was still making 
his way in the Cypress Grove, and Quitman was struggling 
along the causeway, the enemy making an obstinate re- 
sistance on both points, General Scott, fully expecting that 
General Pillow had used his division as he had asked to 
use it, ordered Worth to send one of his brigades around 
Chapultepec to relieve both Pillow and Quitman. This 
order, though distinctly heard by Worth, was not promptly 
carried out. He observed that before he moved a brigade 
in that direction, he wished to know more of the ground. 
Hence the late movement of its execution, as above. Now, 
if it was a proper disposition of Pillow to place two of his 
regiments in observation to be ready to attack the enemy 
in the act of throwing in reinforcements, and if it was right 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 97 

for Tronsdale thus to apply his force and for Worth to sus- 
tain him in it, most surely it was right for Scott in an earli- 
er stage of the contest to order the advance of Worth, when 
in addition to providing against this contingency, he cer- 
tainly relieved both Pillow and Quitman, hotly pressed. 
Yet, Major Ripley says in the first place, that, the order was 
probably never given. 2d. That it was a perfectly useless 
order if given ; and, 3d, that General Worth, at all events, 
made no attempt to execute it. We think that every unpreju- 
diced reader cannot fail to agree with us in opinion, that 
this is pretty rapid criticism. 

2. But we will take a more extended view of these op- 
erations. 

The whole southern and southwestern front of the city, 
of which Chapultepec was the point of attack in the opera- 
tions against the city, was to the whole army what the 
southwestern front of Chapultepec was to Pillow's division. 
What was the relative course of the Commander in Chief 
and his subordinate ? 

Against that single strategic point, General Scott direct- 
ed the force of his whole army, excepting one brigade, 
which boldly faced the remainder of the enemy's extended 
line, and diverted nearly one half of the enemy's force. 

Pillow left two of his regiments in his rear, to act as a 
picket — a duty to which, one would suppose, the whole of 
Worth's division was adequate. And then finding his force 
inadequate, instead of calling them to his aid, he asks for a 
brigade of Worth's. Scott, seeing from his position at Tacu- 
baya that both he and Quitman were hotly engaged with 
the enemy, and that the enemy were making a hot resist- 
ance, at this critical moment orders Worth to strike the 
other flank and create a diversion in favor of both. 

If it were wrong for Gen. Scott, to whom the whole of 
Chapultepec was the point of attack, to order a whole bri- 
gade to move on one of its flanks, and which otherwise 
7 



98 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

could not be brought into action, it was surely a violation 
of the rules of art, for Gan. Pillow, to whom the southwest- 
ern front was the line of attack, to send two of his regi- 
ments in another direction, whilst complaining of the inade- 
quacy cf his division. 

Oar author has much to say about bringing a preponder- 
ating force to bear upon the decisive point. What was the 
relative course of the General in Chief and his subordinate 
in their respective spheres ? The General in Chief brought 
to bear upon his decisive point, Chapultepec, seven-eighths 
of his whole force, with which he proposed to attack on all 
sides, leaving none of his battalions out. 

Pillow's whole sphere of operations was the southwestern 
front of Chapultepec. Yet, instead of directing his whole 
force to the decisive point of that front, in his first disposi- 
tions, he left nearly one half of his command entirely out 
of his sphere of operations, assigning to them a duty which 
the General in Ct ief had in view for Worth. 

Yet Major Ripley contends, that Gen. Scott violated that 
great principle of the military art, of bringing a preponder- 
ating force to bear on the decisive point, and that Gen. Pil- 
low illustrated it. 

The whole gist of Major Ripley's criticisms, as was that 
of Gen. Pillow's defence before the court of inquiry, is, that 
Scott was an indifferent spectator of the attack on Chapul- 
tepec, a mile-and-a-half in rear, in Tacubaya — and that 
Pillow was entitled to the chief merit, both of the plan of 
attack and its execut n. 

In truth, it is pretty evident that Pillow was ambitious 
of the whole honor of the western attack ; and it does not 
seem an illiberal criticism to say, that he made his arrange- 
ments with a special view of making Worth's operations 
entirely subordinate to his own. 

How else can we account for the separation of his com- 
mand, sending but little more than one-half to the attack of 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 99 

the western front, and leaving the remainder at the north- 
western angle of Molino to remain in observation, or to at- 
tack according to circumstances, when Worth's entire divi- 
sion was in close proximity? Why was he not content to 
apply his division to its special work? The General in 
Chief acted on the presumption that Pillow had applied his 
division to the work assigned it ; nor did he dream that Pil- 
low, after objecting to a separation of his brigades, had actu- 
ally separated them in his subsequent dispositions. 

The General in Chief, then, applied a preponderating 
force — or seven-eighths of his entire command to the decisive 
point. His subordinate leaves out of his sphere of opera- 
tions entirely, nearly one half of his command. 

We quote again: "All the moral force of the American 
army was restored at the moment when Pillow's victorious 
troops crossed the parapet of Chapidtepec, and in the pride 
and exaltation of the moment, none doubted that the great 
victory of the war had been accomplished, and that the final 
object of the campaign was within reach. The various jea- 
lousies which had place in the American army at a later date, 
had no place then ; and the congratulations of friends, the 
acclaiming shouts of the soldiery, as the commander of the 
western attack was borne wounded into the castle of Cha- 
pultepec, which had been the end of his dispositions and 
his efforts ; and the commendations of the General in Chief 
soon afterwards, told at that time of the imporlance of the 
capture, and to whom its glory belonged." 

We will save the real services of Gen. Pillow from the 
depreciation which must result from such ridiculous exag- 
gerations as the above. He had a simple executive duty to 
perform in the storming of Chapultepec, and he did it well. 
We think his disposition of that portion of his command, 
which he applied to that work, was good. He indeed made 
use of just about the force that could be applied advanta- 
geously, namely, one brigade. Had his other brigade been 



100 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

disposed of as a support, leaving Worth's division entire, his 
arrangements would have been very complete. 

Whilst, therefore, we feel bound to rebuke the attempt 
to manufacture a great commander out of Pillow, we bear 
witness to his zeal, vigor, and gallantry, and we do not 
hesitate to say, that had his friends possessed the virtue of 
silence, his former mistakes would have been passed over 
as the natural result of inexperience, and no one would 
have been found to gainsay his having deserved well of 
his country. We think he earned the reputation of a good 
executive officer ; but this has been withheld from him in 
consequence of the attempts that have been made to exalt his 
reputation at the expense of his commander. The endea- 
vors to raise him above his proper level, have caused him 
to sink much below it. 

It may be asked, why did not Scott persist in his origi- 
nal design of promptly advancing a strong force on either 
side of Chapultepec, seizing its communication with the 
city, and cutting off reinforcements, making it, to use his 
own words, feel its isolation 1 Why did he suspend the 
advance on the road running north of Chapultepec, in order 
that Pillow might move through the Cypress Grove with 
his whole division ? We answer, Gen. Scott knew it was 
the prime condition of success, that the particular com- 
manders should have confidence in themselves. And he 
yielded to Pillow, to insure that the success of Pillow's 
division, so far as it depended on Pillow himself having 
confidence that it would succeed, should not be left to 
chance. Moreover, Gen. Scott did persist in his original 
designs ; for we see that in a few moments after the battle 
commenced, and as soon as the enemy's attention is fixed 
on Pillow and Quitman, Worth is ordered to strike the 
other flank. 

We will bestow a few words on our author's criticisms 
as regards Worth and Quitman. 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 101 

Without dwelling further upon Worth's want of prompt- 
ness in attacking the other flank of Chapultepec, when 
Pillow and Quitman were hotly pressed, we have a 
remark to make on the following observation of our author : 

" The subsequent movements, both on the Belen and 
San Cosme road, had the great element of success — celerity. 
Worth's movements were such as might have been ex- 
pected of him in the pursuit of the victory. They were 
characterized by celerity, until celerity became incompatible 
with prudence, and, meanwhile, by a careful observation 
of the points of the whole field of operations." 

Now, what are the facts ? Worth halted his division for 
one hour and a half on the road leading to the San Cosme 
suburb, its head being within some six hundred yards of a 
strong field work at the junction of the two roads. He 
halted it against the remonstrances of at least one officer 
of his staff, who informed him that the enemy had no guns 
then, but if he delayed, they would bring guns, and sweep 
away the head of his column with grape. He delayed it, 
in spite of the repeated orders of the General in Chief to push 
forward. And for what object? To succor Quitman by 
sending Duncan's battery, and an infantry force, to take 
the enemy in front of Quitman in flank. That it had this 
effect we have no doubt. But the most efficient mode for 
Worth to succor Quitman was to push forward on his own 
line. He would have found the enemy utterly unprepared ; 
and he would have appeared in force at the western en- 
trance, and would have advanced almost unresisted to the 
rear of the citadel, before the terrible fire of that citadel had 
compelled Quitman to bow his head, and keep to cover for 
the remainder of the day. We venture the opinion that 
the city would have been evacuated early in the afternoon. 

The division of Quitman, on the contrary, was pushed 
forward with unexampled vigor ; first by Shields, though 
wounded, turning the head of the command in the direction 



102 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

of the Belen gate, immediately on the fall of Chapultepec, 
and by Quitman bringing up the remainder, and joining 
the advance half way to the city. Yes ; with such vigor 
and resolution was this attack prosecuted, that no one of 
Scott's statf officers, sent out one a/ter another with infor- 
mation that the Cosme suburb was the real point of attack, 
were either able or thought it advisable to deliver the 
order. The division was hotly engaged, and no other 
course remained than to fight it out. 

Thus it happened in the chapter of accidents, that the 
demonstration was converted into a real attack, and the 
real attack was for a time simply a demonstration — a de- 
monstration putting the division in imminent peril, endan- 
gering the defeat of the plans of the General in Chief, in- 
volving much unnecessary delay, giving time to the enemy 
to bring up his guns, and to dispute the advance of Worth's 
division into the city. 

Worth was greatly afflicted by the losses of his division 
at Molino, and was in conseqence admonished of the ne- 
cessity of knowing thoroughly his ground, and of incurring 
no risks. He was on the thirteenth extremely solicitous 
about the safety of his troops. But excepting his delay at 
Chapultepec, and his still more reprehensible delay in ad- 
vancing upon the Cosme suburb, his operations were cha- 
racterized by sound judgment, and were exceedingly 
creditable to him. 

Worth was indeed a gallant soldier, of splendid manners, 
of quick apprehension, zealous, indefatigable, energetic — 
himself fertile in suggestions, and prompt to avail himself 
of the suggestions of others. He has now gone to his long 
home. To the state has he rendered eminent service, and 
let the state ever hold his memory in grateful remem- 
brance. 

Quitman's conduct on the day of the storming of Cha- 
pultepec, is worthy of the highest praise. His sustained 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 103 

energy, his prompt decision, his dauntless bearing, and 
the terrible ordeal through which he pushed his com- 
mand, are proofs of his possessing some of the highest 
qualities of an executive officer. 

Our author to the contrary notwithstanding, General 
Scott was the master-spirit of the operations about Cha- 
pultepec. It was due, under Providence, to his cool head 
and steady hand, that our little army was conducted in 
safety through these scenes of deadly peril. He is equally 
to be dtmmended for his resolution in determining to at- 
tack Chapultepec against the advice of a majority of his 
officers, and for his dispositions in prosecuting that attack. 
All those who had an opportunity to observe him on the 
day of the thirteenth, will remember his remarkable cool- 
ness, steadiness and grasp of the entire field of operations. 
General Scott, in this campaign, combined two qualities 
in an eminent degree — qualities seldom united, yet indis- 
pensable to a great commander the quality' of adhering 
to his plans, always carefully weighed and thoroughly 
digested, with great pertinacity, so long as the circum- 
stances remained the same, with great facility in incor- 
porating new circumstances, and changing his plans to 
conform thereto. This is exemplified in the battle of Chu- 
rubusco. It was fought on the spur of the moment, with- 
out any matured plan, yet the dispositions made were no 
less complete and masterly than the carefully organized 
plan of operations which, commencing with the storming 
of Chapultepee, resulted the next day in the fall of the 
capital. The whole campaign was characterized by large- 
ness of view and exactitude of execution. But the heroic 
element predominated over all others, both in the general 
and his troops. Without it we could not have succeeded. 

We will close this article by submitting our own views 
of the causes of the success of the American arms in Mexico. 
This is necessary in consequence of the erroneous ideas that 



104 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

pervade the public mind as to the qualities required, both 
on the part of soldiers and commanders, to insure success, 
ideas that Major Ripley's work has rather tended to confirm 
than to correct. The impression left on the mind of his 
reader is, that the battles in Mexico were fought and won, 
simply in consequence of the good conduct of the subordi- 
nate officers and the men, and that whoever had been in 
chief command the result would doubtless have been the 
same. This is totally wrong. Nothing is ever accomplish- 
ed without a directing head : and in no position #re cool 
judgment, a large grasp of the whole field of operations, 
and a will that shall rise superior to partial and timid views, 
so much needed as in command of an army. Nor is this 
all. It is a most mistaken idea that a knowledge of what 
is technically called the military art is alone essential. It 
is only a subordinate quality. It is impossible to conduct 
large military operations without the possession of the same 
civil and adtninistrative qualities, which are required to 
govern a state or rule an empire. I unhesitatingly refer to 
the whole history of the world in proof of this. Alexander 
conquered the world, because in addition to that great soul 
and that extended knowledge which enabled him to direct 
his Greeks with such signal skill and success, he was the 
most consummate statesman of his age. Without the pos- 
session of the same qualities, Wellington would early have 
been driven from Spain, and the famous Italian campaigns 
of Napoleon would yet have to be written. Washington 
was so eminently fitted to conduct his countrymen through 
the war of Independence, from his happy blending of civil 
and military qualities. And this is the secret of the mis- 
erable failure of many military men, whose reputations, once 
almost colossal, have long since departed. They have been 
able to shine on a battle-field, and to exhibit constancy and 
conduct in the vicissitudes of a campaign, but when risen 
to high command they have failed, because they knew not 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 105 

how to pacificate a state, to impress law and order upon a 
people that had succumbed to their arms. 

It was the exceeding good fortune of the American peo- 
ple, that their chiefs in Mexico were men remarkable for 
their qualities of administration. Indeed, as regards both 
Taylor and Scott, it would seem, that the secret of all their 
successes was to be found in the possession of one quality 
— judgment. They had the power of grasping and weigh- 
ing and understanding their whole field. The careful ob- 
server and thinker cannot fail to see that this large faculty, 
the growth and fruit of a noble soul and a large intellect, 
would have caused both to have been distinguished in 
almost any sphere. They strike us as not particularly mili- 
tary men, but as having succeeded in their military opera- 
tions simply in consequence of the application of large fac- 
ulties in a military direction. 

Whilst, therefore, we insist that the largest element in 
our success was the able direction of our force, we con- 
cur with every thing Major Ripley says in praise of the sub- 
ordinate officers and men. They were worthy of and nobly 
seconded their chiefs. 

But the statesmen at the head of our government are 
entitled to a large share of the gratitude of posterity, for 
these astonishing successes. They had faith in American 
progress, and in the great destinies in reserve for the Ameri- 
can people. They entered upon the discharge of their du- 
ties with the fixed determination to promote the honor and 
renown of their country. Their whole force was applied to 
administering the government with entire fidelity to its in- 
terests, its wants, and the great laws of its progress. They 
cordially supported our generals in the field, though these 
generals belonged to the conservative party in politics. The 
exertions of Gov. Marcy to this effect were not only unspar- 
ing, but his success was so complete as to make his admin- 
istration an epoch in the history of the war department. 



106 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

No war in our history, no war in English history, has ex- 
hibited such a union of ability and good faith on the part of 
the government, whose duty it was to point out the general 
object to be accomplished and to supply the means, and on 
the part of the generals, whose duty it was to apply the 
means to the accomplishment of the desired object. The 
correspondence of the War Department especially, will com- 
mand the admiration of all reflecting men, for its unsur- 
passed ability. We have felt obliged in justice to the truth, 
to animadvert with some severity upon portions of Marcy's 
reply to Scott. But to his great ability, his incorruptible 
integrity, we shall ever bear willing and grateful testi- 
mony. 

Indeed, as regards the American people, its government 
and its army, there was but one voice, one hand. With- 
out this union in sentiment and in action, we could not 
have achieved so large a measure of success. 

But Mexico too had able leaders, a brave and loyal 
people. All authority was in the hands of one man. 
Santa Anna, trained in her war of Independence, and 
having a large experience in civil duties, was fully equal 
to the command of a large army, and to the direction of 
varied and difficult operations. His success in developing 
and thf'ice re-organizing the resources of his country, after 
the successive disasters of Monterey, Buena Vista, and 
Cerro Gordo, are conclusive as to his extended genius for 
administration. As a strategist he was certainly not infe- 
rior to either of his great antagonists, and his enemies are 
compelled to bear witness to his personal conduct on the 
field of battle. The protracted resistance of Churubusco, 
and the stern front of Belen and of Cosme, were due to 
his personal exertions. In defeat and vicissitude, he 
showed admirable constancy and a heroic spirit. His oc- 
cupancy of Orazava, after the disaster of Cerro Gordo, his 
abandonment of civil trusts, and his march upon Puebla, 



RIO GRANDE AND OF MEXICO. 107 

after having been driven from the valley, remind us of 
Marius sitting on the ruins of Carthage. 

A critical examination of his whole management of the 
Mexican war will show that he is deserving the gratitude 
of his countrymen, and the respect of his antagonists. In 
the valley of Mexico, the earlier defeats were due to a posi- 
tive disobedience of his orders by Valencia ; and after the 
armistice, his only mistake was in offering his flank to our 
blow at Molino. The defences of the city were arranged 
with judgment. They were well provided with armaments. 
The Mexican troops not only thrice outnumbered the 
American army, but they were brave troops, who fought 
hopefully for their country, and died manfully at their 
posts. We must therefore consider another element that 
was the main cause of our success. 

That element is the disparity of races. We prevailed 
over the Mexicans for the same reasons that the Greeks 
conquered Persia. The Persians were brave, high-spirited, 
proud of their ancient prowess, and confident that they 
were invincible against a world. Yet the troops prepared 
by Philip of Macedon prevailed in every encounter, and 
Alexander died at thirty-two the master of the world. The 
people of Asia were living on their past renown, and were 
in the full fruition of the accumulations of past generations. 
They succumbed to a people having a future which they 
were resolved to achieve. 

So of the people of Mexico. Their future is in their 
past. They have neither the spirit of enterprise, nor the 
individuality of the people of the United States. They 
have not had our two hundred years of discipline and of 
culture, in the full enjoyment of regulated liberty. Origi- 
nally a military despotism, they have sadly fallen away 
from the stern virtues of the men of Cortez, and still suffer 
from military license, without receiving the protection 
which should be guaranteed by military authority. 



108 CAMPAIGNS OF THE 

The people of the United States, always free, always 
living under a government of their own choice, have at- 
tained a development in all the elements that make a 
people great that has never been approached. They have 
great destinies before them. We warn our countrymen 
that in future wars, discipline, skill, conduct, are indis- 
pensable elements of success. That an army may accom- 
plish the greatest things, each man must feel that on his 
single arm rests the victory, yet the whole mass must 
move as one man. We must surpass the chosen troops of 
all other powers in all those things which tend to make 
men effective, as well as in the men themselves. Our 
military establishments must be cherished, arms be deemed 
a great and noble profession, improvements be encouraged, 
and a nucleus be maintained upon which we can rely in 
time of war. Otherwise we shall be shamefully beaten in 
our first campaigns with those great powers, with whom 
we shall one day be brought in collision, in consequence 
of their endeavoring to obstruct our rapid march to great- 
ness, and thus injury be done to the honor and glory of our 
country. At this moment our army organization is much 
inferior to those of the other great powers. Let our army 
be cherished, let an organization be effected, based on our 
own experience, and which shall be the natural product of 
our own glorious free institutions. It will be superior to 
all existing organizations, and we shall surpass the world 
in arms as in arts, in war as well as peace. 



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FACTURES, AND MINES. New edition, 
with Supplement. 8vo., Bheep 5 00 



Supplement to do., separate. 8vo., 

sheep 1 £0 

InP> 
A PRACTICAL TREATISE UN THE MA- 
RINE ENGINE. For t'.ie use of Mechanics 
and Engineers. By Thos. J. Main and Thos. 
Brown, with American Additions. 8vo., il- 
lustrated. 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MECHANICS OF 
NATURE, and of the Source and Modes of 
Propagation of Natural Motive Powers. By 
Z. Allen. One vol., Svo 

METALLURGY; Embracing the Elements of 
Mining Operations, and Analyses of Ores : 
a full Description of all Smelting and other 
Operations for the Production of Metuls from 
the Ores. With numerous Wood Engrav- 
ings of Machinery, Furnaces, and Apparatus. 
By Frederick Overman, Author of a Treatise 
on the Manufacture of Iron, &c. One vol., 
8vo., of 500 or 600 pages 



H 1 5S 70 










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